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PREFACE 
 
Infrastructure development plays a major role in promoting growth and reducing poverty. In 
Africa, however, underdeveloped infrastructure continues to be a binding constraint on 
sustainable development. Notably, African countries, through the continent’s A genda 2063, 
recognize that developing infrastructure—transport, energy, water, and e-connectivity—will 
be critical for the continent to assume a lasting place in the global economic system. The 
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) has produced this occasional paper under its 
supported Strategic Studies Group (SSG) to provoke discussion and further investigation of 
critical capacity challenges to be addressed in developing infrastructure in Africa.  
This occasional paper delves into important questions: What is the state of Africa’s 
infrastructure? What is infrastructure’s role in Africa’s economic performance? What strategies 
will finance infrastructure in Africa, and how effective are they? How do the various actors 
develop and finance infrastructure? And more important, what are the capacity imperatives for 
infrastructure development and financing in Africa? 
One key message is that infrastructure quality is more important than infrastructure stocks for 
economic growth. Emphasis should be placed not on providing infrastructure bulk but on 
ensuring that public infrastructure can increase the rate of return on private capital.  
The three case-study countries (Kenya, Mauritius, and South Africa) show that capacity is 
lacking for governments to mobilize resources or tap capital markets for financing 
infrastructure. Similarly, there is a shortage of competent transaction advisors who can 
structure financing to meet issuers’ needs. Public officers lack the skills to interact effectively 
with private-sector financiers and to prepare and evaluate tenders. Where such systems are 
being tried, as in Kenya, modern computerized procurement and project-management systems 
are not being used to make the process more efficient. 
It is important to establish autonomous, well-resourced, and technically competent public–
private partnership (PPP) departments to streamline PPP management processes.  
The ACBF believes that producing knowledge on efficient infrastructure development and 
financing will enhance the evidence-based policymaking process on the continent, leading to 
sustainable infrastructure development and subsequent inclusive growth. 
 
Professor Emmanuel Nnadozie 
Executive Secretary 
The African Capacity Building Foundation 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Of the world’s developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has the worst infrastructure deficit, with 
studies pointing to lost growth opportunities. This study presents in one document infor mation 
previously dispersed on the region’s infrastructure stock and modes of financing. It assesses 
infrastructure’s role in the region’s economic growth. It identifies specific capacity constraints 
that have hindered the private sector’s participation in  infrastructure financing. And it suggests 
a framework for advancing institutional and human resource capacities to boost infrastructure 
financing. The authors first reviewed documents addressing the region’s infrastructure. They 
then conducted case studies of private sector involvement in infrastructure financing in Kenya, 
Mauritius, and South Africa. And, using the generalized method of moments (GMM), estimated 
an infrastructure-augmented growth model. 
Key findings 
From the document review, the study found the following: 
• Power is the most deficient infrastructure in the Sub-Saharan region, with spending 
needs estimated at $41 billion annually between 2005 and 2015 for operations and 
maintenance, generating new capacity and rehabilitation of existing transmission and 
generation. 
• The transport sector requires spending of approximately $18 billion a year, half for 
maintenance, to build sufficient regional, national, rural, and urban road connectivity, 
accompanied by adequate rail, port, and airport infrastructure. 
• The estimated information and communications technology (ICT) sector annual 
investment need is $9 billion, including $2 billion for maintenance, to service existing 
demand. 
• The water sector’s annual funding gap is $11 billion: the region needs to spend about 
0.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) a year on sanitation, of which 0.7 percent 
is for investment and 0.2 percent is for operation and maintenance to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal target. 
• Sub-Saharan Africa loses about $17 billion annually to various inefficiencies in 
infrastructure operations and spending. Opportunities for efficiency gains include 
improving budget execution rates; reallocating existing budgets to subsectors with 
the highest economic returns, such as power; raising user charges closer to cost-
recovery levels; and promoting service quality for all utilities.  
 From the case analyses of Kenya, Mauritius, and South Africa, the study makes the 
following general observations: 
• Institutional investors display sufficient appetite for public debt issues, which has not, 
however, been sufficiently matched by the supply of public debt. To avoid crowding 
out the private sector, states have tended to refrain from using domestic bond markets 
to finance their infrastructure development needs. 
• Governments have the capacity to run PPP projects and to provide guarantees to PPP 
financiers, but they have not adequately used that capacity because of, for example, 
poor project planning, cumbersome legislative frameworks, and unwieldy 
procurement procedures that encourage corrupt practices. 
• Governments can absorb large amounts of money for infrastructure projects, including 
debt and grants from international financial markets and sources. 
• Human resource capacity has serious shortfalls. Ministerial staff members cannot 
conduct bankable studies, and they cannot effectively simulate bids and develop 
reasonable estimates to guide bid solicitation processes. 
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• Although most governments have, or are in the process of attaining, computerized 
project and financial management functions, putting those processes in place must be 
done expeditiously to allow greater efficiency in procuring financing, ensuring 
transparency in the PPPs’ bidding process, and setting up project controls.  
From the infrastructure-augmented growth model estimation, this study finds that the quality 
of infrastructure is more important than infrastructure stocks for economic growth, which 
suggests that emphasis should be placed not on providing the infrastructure “bulk” but on 
ensuring that public infrastructure can increase the rate of return on private capital.  
Suggested capacity-building interventions 
The study demonstrates that issuing infrastructure bonds in domestic capital markets rather 
than in foreign markets is more cost-effective for governments. But because domestic markets 
are not developed to levels that can meaningfully support such issues, governments should 
develop the capacity to formulate policies and provide incentives to spur domestic public debt 
market development. 
African countries with fairly large capital markets should deepen them by creating or 
incentivizing the engineering of additional securities. In some cases, capital market regulations 
that govern the issuance of asset-backed securities are either ineffective or inadequate to 
incentivize the creation of such securities. That is why the regulatory bodies for African capital 
markets need to build capacity so that they can, in liaison with their governments, go beyond 
just providing an avenue for securitization. We recommend that governments consider 
providing guarantees for securities originated (through securitization) by banks from their 
infrastructure-financing portfolios. 
Governments need to develop in-house expertise in project planning and management and to 
encourage pooling, at the national level, of transaction advisors. Those advisors should provide 
guidance at all stages of PPP processes and create capacity to engage meaningfully with 
private sector participants. In that regard, Sub-Saharan governments could consider adopting 
a policy of jointly developing a pool of human resources for the whole region and sharing those 
resources as needed to reduce reliance on more expensive expertise from outside the 
continent. 
Governments should fully adopt computerized systems in the infrastructure function and, to 
deal with human resource constraints in the short term, outsource qualified personnel to run 
such systems as they build internal capacity for the long run. 
Policy recommendations 
The study makes policy recommendations for capacity enhancement and lays out a capacity 
enhancement program for Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, governments should undertake the 
following: 
• Formulate policies and incentivize the development of domestic public debt markets.  
• Conduct regular training needs assessments, and train those in need through 
apprenticeships to the technical staff currently hired from abroad or from the private 
sector; second staff to organizations that typically deal with infrastructure issues; 
provide regular in-service workshops; and collaborate with training institutions, such 
as universities. 
• Consider providing guarantees for securities originated by banks from their 
infrastructure financing portfolios (that is, governments should support 
securitization). 
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• Establish autonomous, well-resourced, and technically competent PPP departments to 
streamline PPP management processes at the bid solicitation phase and at post -award 
and contract management phases. 
• Develop in-house expertise in project planning and management, and encourage 
pooling of transaction advisors, to provide guidance at all stages of the PPP process 
and to create capacity to engage meaningfully with private sector participants.  
• Provide education to both the private and the public sectors about the workings of 
PPPs, and improve the levels of trust for PPPs by making the process transparent.  
• Consider private financing of development and infrastructure through more robust 
and fairer fiscal and tax systems, borrowing from the Organisat ion for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) initiative on base erosion and profit shifting.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
The benefits of infrastructure development cannot be refuted.1 Broadly speaking, 
infrastructure provides services that form a part of residents’ consumption bundles; it 
augments capital and labor as an input in the production process (Ayogu 2007). And it drives 
societal progress by promoting human development and betters residents’ quality of life 
through improved productivity and sustainable economic growth (Sanchez-Robles 1998; Egert, 
Kozluk, and Sutherland 2009; Ajakaiye and Ncube 2010). More specifically, infrastructure eases 
labor mobility, enhances trade and commerce, and encourages cultural exchanges that can 
promote national integration and reduce conflict (Mbaku 2013). Research and policy analysis 
also point to the role of infrastructure provision in reducing poverty and inequality (Ndulu 
2006; World Bank 2006). 
Background 
Indeed, the African Union (2014), in Aspiration 2 of Agenda 2063, seems to recognize research 
outcomes regarding infrastructure’s role in economic development when it states, as follows:  
By 2063, the necessary infrastructure will be in place to support 
Africa’s accelerated integration and growth, technological 
transformation, trade and development. This will include high-speed 
railway networks, roads, shipping lines, sea and air transport, as well 
as well-developed ICT and digital economy. A Pan African High Speed 
Rail network will connect all the major cities/capitals of the 
continent, with adjacent highways and pipelines for gas, oil, water, 
as well as ICT Broadband cables and other infrastructure. This will be 
a catalyst for manufacturing, skills development, technology, 
research and development, integration and intra-African trade, 
investments and tourism. 
Yet, as of today, infrastructure development is not at an optimal level in the Sub -Saharan 
region. Indeed, governments and their various development partners recognize the region’s 
colossal infrastructure gap and its resultant adverse impact on development efforts in various 
economic sectors. The huge infrastructure gap speaks to unexploited productive potential, 
which could be tapped by upping infrastructure investments. Studies have ident ified 
substantial infrastructure needs in the region. In the mid-2000s, estimated annual 
infrastructure expenditure needs, over a 10-year period, ranged between 9 percent and 13 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Sachs et al. 2004; Economic Commission for Africa 
2005). At the end of the last decade, annual infrastructure investment needs for Africa as a 
whole were estimated at $93 billion, about one-third for operations and maintenance (Foster 
and Briceño-Garmendia 2009). Because current infrastructure spending is only about $45 billion 
a year, the financing gap is clearly sizable (AfDB 2013a).  
The poor state of Sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure has been documented by AfDB (2011a), 
which states that the region’s infrastructure is the most deficient and costly in the developing 
world. Ascribing the high infrastructure cost to diseconomies of scale and lack of competition, 
                                                          
1 This paper focuses on physical infrastructure, which refers to “highways and roads, mass-transit and airport 
facilities, telecommunication facilities, gas and water supply facilities and distribution systems, electricity, 
education buildings, waste treatment facilities, police, fire service, judiciary and correctional institutions” (Ayogu 
2007). 
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the AfDB report estimates that about $93 billion (15 percent of GDP) per year will be required 
to fix the infrastructure gap. About half of that amount would be needed in the power sector, 
where access to electricity is only 25 percent, compared with 50 percent in South Asia and 80 
percent in Latin America. The report notes that mobilizing investments in the power sector is 
made difficult by financially weak institutions that have an aggregate annual revenue shortfall 
of approximately $8 billion. This speaks to institutional capacity, an important element of this 
study. 
The situation is no better in other sectors. According to AfDB (2011b), the provision of water is 
falling, with approximately 40 percent of rural dwellers in the region lacking access to clean 
drinking water. The annual funding gap is estimated at $11 billion, or about 50 percent of total 
funding needs. The sector is characterized by massive waste, losing about $1 billion each year 
to operational inefficiencies of water utilities—another pointer to the region’s capacity issues. 
Further to these dismal statistics, empirical investigations within the Sub-Saharan region point 
to lost growth opportunities as a result of poor infrastructure development. The landlocked 
nature of many Sub-Saharan African countries puts them at a geographical disadvantage in 
attracting foreign trade and investments (Behar and Manners 2008) and retards economic 
growth. Such geographical setbacks may be redressed through adequate development of the 
telecommunications and transport infrastructure. Country-specific studies—for instance, in 
Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson 1999) and Ghana (Estache and Vagliasindi 2007)—also provide 
evidence suggesting that poor infrastructure development may have played a key role in 
thwarting the region’s economic growth. 
Given those observations, a vital task is to examine the challenges that have resulted in 
deficiencies in infrastructure development and financing in Sub-Saharan Africa and to identify 
appropriate and effective strategies to address them. AfDB (2013b) attributes the below -par 
infrastructure performance in Africa to institutional factors and suggests that r eforming 
existing institutions with a view to expanding their capacity and efficiency must be the first 
step in any attempt to address the infrastructure gap. Thus, researchers must identify specific 
capacity constraints that have hindered the efficient use of existing infrastructure for residents 
and develop a clear and logical framework for enhancing institutional and human resource 
capacity. And given the associated externalities, researchers must assess the strategic options 
available, taking into consideration the interplay among productive infrastructure 
underpinning the national economy, urban infrastructure, and rural infrastructure (see, for 
example, Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). 
Study objectives 
The proposed study’s objectives are as follows: 
• Take stock of the state (access, quality, and costs) of infrastructural development and 
financing. 
• Assess infrastructure’s role in economic performance.  
• Identify specific capacity constraints that have hindered the private sector’s 
participation in infrastructure financing. 
• Develop a clear and logical framework for institutional and human resource capacity 
enhancement to boost infrastructure financing. 
To address those issues, we employ several approaches. First, we collate and analyze 
information from different academic and policy analysis sources to estimate the state of 
infrastructure financing and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, we gather evidence 
on private sector participation in infrastructure financing in the region—and on the adequacy 
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of its institutional and human resource capacity—by reviewing case studies of Kenya, 
Mauritius, and South Africa. We use lessons from those countries to draw inferences about the 
effectiveness of various financing strategies and capacity needs and to proffer policy 
suggestions. Third, we explore the relationship between infrastructure and various economic 
fundamentals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on annual data for 2000–2012 from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators, we test an infrastructure -augmented growth model for 
a panel of all Sub-Saharan countries, using the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Literature review 
The links between infrastructure, productivity, and economic development have received a lot 
of interest from researchers in Africa (Ayogu 2007; Ajakaiye and Ncube 2010) and in many other 
parts of the world (Esfahani and Ramirez 2003; Egert, Kozluk, and Sutherland 2009). The nexus 
between infrastructure and poverty and equity in resource allocation has also been analyzed 
(Ndulu 2006; World Bank 2006). Empirical findings are varied, but a consensus seems to be 
emerging that infrastructure plays a key role in a country’s economic performance and, by 
extension, poverty alleviation. Such evidence has been provided through various 
methodologies from the United States (Munnell 1990), France (Cadot, Röller, and Stephan 
1999), Germany (Kemmerling and Stephan 2002), Spain (Moreno, López-Bazo, and Artís 2003), 
and panels of several countries (Mittnik and Neumann 2001; Kamps 2004). Most stud ies find a 
positive long-term effect of infrastructure on output. 
Infrastructure financing has also been the topic of several studies. In Africa, Briceño -
Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009) point out that the region’s countries spend between 6 
percent and 12 percent of their GDPs on infrastructure, but because their economies are small, 
that investment does not amount to much in absolute terms. But the region’s aid -dependent 
low-income countries devote about 30 percent of additional funding to infrastructur e. Irving 
and Manroth (2009), using data from 24 African countries, suggest that institutional investors 
should be developed, particularly pension funds. With proper regulation, those investors could 
realize their full potential and replace local banks as infrastructure financiers because their 
liabilities better match the longer terms of infrastructure projects.  
Although private sector financing is broadly seen as the remedy to the infrastructure gap, Sub -
Saharan Africa receives only a small share of private infrastructure investment due to low or 
nonexistent sovereign credit ratings, limited capacity of local financial markets, and higher 
risks arising from longer payout periods and susceptibility to political interference and 
regulatory risks (Sheppard, von Klaudy, and Kumar 2006).2 But more innovative financing 
strategies involving private participation have been developed, including public –private 
partnerships (PPPs);3 local currency infrastructure bonds; and commodity-linked bonds, which 
are typically issued as exchange-traded funds (Brixiova et al. 2011). Ncube (2010) breaks down 
PPPs into various categories and discusses their strengths and shortcomings in the African 
context.4 The proposed study aims to contribute to this emerging discourse by, among other 
efforts, rigorously analyzing the suitability of those new funding strategies to the Sub -Saharan 
region.  
                                                          
2 Only 16 of 48 countries have foreign currency debt ratings, and only 4 have ratings of BB– or higher, which 
provide relatively broad access to financial markets (Sheppard, von Klaudy, and Kumar 2006). 
3 PPPs can ease budget constraints and raise efficiency by leveraging private sector management expertise and 
innovation. Developing a comprehensive and transparent list of contingent liabilities, such as government debt 
guarantees, is key for realistic assessment of fiscal risks stemming from PPPs (Ncube 2010; Brixiova et al. 2011). 
4 These categories include Design-Bid-Build, Private Contract Fee Services, Design-Build, Build-Operate-Transfer, 
Long-term Lease Agreements, Design-Build-Finance-Operate, Build-Own-Operate, and others. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE STATE OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
Data on the state of infrastructure in Africa are currently available in several documents 
generated by different researchers and policy analysts in several institutions, including the 
World Bank, the African Development Bank, regional development banks (such as the East 
African Development Bank) and country-specific repositories. In the first part of this study, we 
collate and present data to provide unified estimate of the state of the region’s infrastructure 
financing and development. 
One comprehensive account of Sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure endowment—the one that 
underpins our study—is the widely cited work of Yepes, Pierce, and Foster (2008). In their 
analysis, the Sub-Saharan region trails its peers in the developing world on nearly every 
infrastructure metric. The situation is worse for the low-income countries in the region; the 
East African Community has the worst performance, while the Southern African Development 
Community seems to be the most infrastructure endowed (table 2.3 of Yepes, Pierce, and 
Foster 2008). Studies conducted around the same time (such as Foster 2008) concur with those 
findings. An important contribution of Yepes, Pierce, and Foster (2008) is the estimate of SSA’s 
infrastructure deficit relative to other regions of comparable income levels (table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure deficit 
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Total road densitya    137 215 293 152 306 237 576 740 599 
Paved road densitya    31 94 238 49 149 59 335 418 482 
Fixed-line telephone densityb   10 106 120 33 39 90 261 197 100 
Mobile telephone densityb    55 201 422 101 86 208 489 350 224 
Internet densityb   2.0 5.1 10.3 2.8 1.7 6.6 16.4 14.1 10.1 
Electricity generation capacityc    37 256 246 70 154 231 970 464 496 
Electricity coveraged    16 35 28 18 44 57 — 79 88 
Clean waterd   60 75 90 63 72 75 87 90 85 
Sanitationd    34 48 39 35 48 60 78 77 77 
a. Km/1,000 km2. b. Subscribers per 1,000 people. c. MW per 1 million people. d. Percentage of households 
with access. 
Note: Km = kilometer; MW = megawatt. 
Source: Yepes, Pierce, and Foster 2008. 
The large infrastructure deficit in Sub-Saharan Africa was believed to be holding back per capita 
economic growth by 2 percentage points annually and reducing firms’ productivity by up to 40 
percent (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Although some infrastructure indicators (such 
as Internet and mobile telephone access) have seen improvements over time, SSA’s low 
infrastructure development, relative to other regions at the same income, is still an important 
issue. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of infrastructure endowments for developing regions 
between 2007 and 2013. The infrastructure situation in the Sub-Saharan region remains 
abysmal. Sub-Saharan Africa trails all developing regions in every infrastructure index. For 
instance, fixed-line telephone coverage has stagnated over time at fewer than 0.5 lines per 
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1,000 people, compared with other developing countries, all of which have at least 1.5 lines per 
1,000 people. To some extent, the apparent low telephone reach has been compensated for by 
the expanding mobile telephone coverage, but even on the mobile telephone score, Sub-
Saharan Africa is poor relative to other developing regions. The discussion that follows 
examines the state of various kinds of infrastructure in the region. 
Power  
As seen in both table 2.1 and figure 2.1, power generation and transmission seems  to be the 
worst performing infrastructure sector for the Sub-Saharan region. The situation is critical in 
the low-income countries, where only about 16 percent of the population had access to 
electricity in the mid-2000s (table 2.1), compared with 88 percent in neighboring North Africa 
and the Middle East. Various accounts have documented the critical power situation in Sub -
Saharan Africa: Over a five-year period, between 2008 and 2012, the region’s total primary 
energy consumption increased by only 0.9 percent—from 10.23 Q Btu’s to 10.32 Q Btu’s.5 In 
2012, the region consumed only about 1.9 percent of world energy consumption. Furthermore, 
only about 32 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans have access to electricity (World Bank data).6  
                                                          
5 Q Btu’s = Quadrillions of British thermal units. 
6 All World Bank data used in this paper were accessed on various dates between March and May 2015 from 
World Development Indicators, from the following website:  
http://0-databank.worldbank.org.innopac.wits.ac.za/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators. 
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Figure 2.1: Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa infrastructure deficit  
 
 
  
Note: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MNA = Middle East & North Africa; LAC = Latin America & Caribbean; ECA = 
Europe & Central Asia; EAP = East Asia & Pacific. 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Estimates for 2012 indicate that the 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a combined 
population of nearly 1 billion people, actually generate 389,000 gigawatt -hours (GWh) of 
electricity (of which South Africa’s share is 239,000 GWh, or 61 percent), amounting to only 1.8 
percent of the world’s total electricity output and about 78 percent of South Korea’s (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration [EIA] data).7 The region’s installed electricity generation 
capacity is approximately 70 GW, with a deficit of about 70 GW (World Bank data); however, 
about 25 percent of that capacity is not operational because the plants are aging or in a state 
                                                          
7 http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#summary (accessed July 29, 2015). 
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of disrepair (most existing power stations were commissioned before 1990)—an indication of 
underinvestment in the energy sector over time. 
That situation has led to decreased efficiency, higher maintenance costs, and frequent power 
outages (KPMG 2014). The number of days per year of outages in the region range from 6 
(South Africa) to as many as 182 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), with each outage 
averaging between 4.15 hours in South Africa and 19.31 hours in Angola (Eberhard et al. 2011). 
In most countries, a good portion of power generation is from hydropower stations, coal, and 
gas power plants. The more expensive thermal generation (using diesel turbines) is used in 
many countries to boost supply in times of low baseload generation. To meet suppressed 
demand, to provide additional capacity, and to support projected economic growth, installed 
electricity production capacity should grow by more than 7 GW per year (Eberhard et al. 2011).  
Transport  
Ports infrastructure 
Sub-Saharan Africa has an extensive port system, which was built to serve the needs of 
individual countries and the neighboring hinterlands (Transnet 2014). The West African ports 
focus on exports of primarily agricultural exports and oil; the Southern African ports handle a 
variety of imports and mineral exports; and the East African ports process various imports and 
exports. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) report that several ports suffer from low 
capacity, particularly in terminal storage, maintenance, and dredging capability, and are poorly 
equipped and inefficient (with high port charges and low container handling rates).  
In terms of traffic, the region witnessed approximately 7 percent per annum growth in both 
containerized and general cargo between 1995 and 2005 (Mundy and Penfold 2008), and 
container growth is believed to be about 2 percent higher than the world average (Transnet 
2014). But capacity use is estimated at only 80 percent, which is likely to persist into the near 
future. The ports are generally poorly equipped, operate at low levels of productivity, and are 
mostly incapable of handling the current generation of large ships (Mundy and Penfold 2008). 
Further, because few ports focus on dry bulk products in the region, bulk terminals are 
relatively small and are placed within the general break-bulk cargo and container berths. Given 
the emerging need to export large quantities of mineral products, especially to the Eastern 
hemisphere, the situation is untenable. 
The region’s air traffic grew at an estimated 6 percent a year from 1997 to 2006, but the growth 
was stronger in Southern and Eastern Africa (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Air cargo is 
important in some export trades (such as flowers from Kenya and fish from Tanzania). 
Generally, air infrastructure capacity is not a serious problem (Foster and Briceño -Garmendia 
2010)—the number of airports is stable, and enough runways exist to handle traffic, with good 
scheduling and modest investment in taxiways and terminals. But air traffic control facilities 
need to be modernized and improved. 
Rail transport infrastructure 
About 47 railways operate in 32 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the total track rail length 
estimated at 82,000 km (Bullock 2009). The key railway infrastructure metrics do not suggest 
a good railway network for many countries in the region. For instance, the spatial density, 
which compares track mileage with the size of a country, ranges from 1 to 6 for most countries 
and 16 for South Africa; 13 countries have no operating railway. But that measure may be 
misleading for countries with large underdeveloped areas. To complement the measure, the 
network density per million inhabitants, which ranges from 30 to 50 for most Sub-Saharan 
countries but is fairly high for Gabon (520), Botswana (480), and South Africa (460), is often 
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used (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). European countries range from 200 to 1,000. 
Southern Africa does an estimated 74 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s freight traffic, 70 percent 
of total passenger kilometers, and more than 80 percent of total net ton-kilometers (Transnet 
2014). 
Outside South Africa, the region’s rail network is poorly maintained  and aging, with a large part 
of the tracks still based on early 20th century technology (Transnet 2014). Poor maintenance 
has led to the track’s deterioration and caused a loss of competitiveness and rolling -stock 
productivity (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Proper using the available capacity, 
therefore, requires substantial capital investment in rehabilitation and upgrading; some 
countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, have initiated the upgrading process. Furthermore, 
several Sub-Saharan countries have concessioned their railway networks to realize the benefits 
of a more efficient private sector management (see, for example, AfDB 2011a).  
Road infrastructure 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s road network comprises strategic trading corridors of not more than 
10,000 kilometers that carry about $200 billion of trade annually. The road access rate is only 
34 percent, compared with 50 percent in other parts of the developing world, while transport 
costs are 100 percent higher (African Union 2014). The region has ambitions for an intraregional 
road network, called the Trans-African Highway, which remains a pipedream due to poor 
maintenance on key segments. Such a network would require construction of between 60,000 
and 100,000 kilometers of paved road (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). The region’s road 
density (204 kilometers of road per 1,000 square kilometers of land area) is substantially less 
than the world average of 944 kilometers per 1,000 square kilometers. That density is less than 
30 percent of the next-lowest region, South Asia. Furthermore, as of 2011, only about 15 percent 
of the region’s roads were paved, compared to 26 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
65 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, 76 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, and 8 6 
percent in developing Europe and Central Asia (World Bank data).  
Nonetheless, the region’s road density in relation to population is slightly higher than South 
Asia’s and only slightly lower than the Middle East and North Africa’s (Foster and Briceño -
Garmendia 2010). Important to note is that Sub-Saharan Africa’s existing road network also is 
not fully used. For instance, traffic volumes are low and typically concentrated in major 
networks, averaging only about 500 vehicles per day, and the traffic volume in rural areas is 
only 30 vehicles per day except in Nigeria and South Africa, where it is higher (Gwilliam et al. 
2008). Rural road networks typically carry less than 10 percent of the classified network’s traffic 
except in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria, where they carry more than 20 percent. 
Water and sanitation 
Water is an important resource for development. But existing estimates show that about 300 
million people in Sub-Saharan Africa experience water scarcity (ECA 2006). The region has 
ample water resources, but they are underdeveloped, unsustainably managed, and 
underutilized, with only 5 percent of agriculture using irrigation (African Union 2014). The 
Africa Water Vision 2025 called for an increase in the development of water resources potential 
by 5 percent in 2005, 10 percent in 2015, and 25 percent in 2025, to meet increased demand 
from agriculture, hydropower, tourism, and transportation. 
Despite efforts to develop water resources, however, water provision has declined, and water 
utilities in urban areas have struggled to keep pace with population growth; in rural areas, more 
than 40 percent of residents have continued to rely on surface water and boreholes (Foster 
and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Indeed, recent UNICEF statistics show that, as of 2012—with the 
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exception of Oceania, where only 56 percent of the population has access to improved drinking 
water—Sub-Saharan Africa, with 64 percent, lags behind all regions and also falls below the 
least developed countries average of 66 percent (see figure 2.2).8 Overall, 748 million people 
worldwide did not have access to improved drinking water in 2012; 43 percent (or 325 million) 
of those people live in Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO and UNICEF 2014). Those figures suggest that 
two of every five people in the world without access to improved drinking water live in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Figure 2.2: Access to improved water, by region 
 
Source: WHO and UNICEF 2014. 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s sanitation situation seems even bleaker. Foster and Briceño -Garmendia 
(2010) report that about 30 percent of the region’s population (40 percent in rural areas) 
practices open defecation, and about half the population—urban and rural, rich and poor—use 
unimproved latrines, resulting in poorly understood health effects. Figure 2.3, which compares 
the use of improved sanitation facilities across regions, shows that the region’s progress in 
improving sanitary conditions has been slow—access to improved sanitation grew by only 6 
percentage points, from 24 percent in 1990 to 30 percent in 2012. 
Figure 2.3: Access to improved sanitation, by region 
 
Source: WHO and UNICEF 2014. 
In some cases, the population covered by improved sanitary facilities actually declined. For 
instance, in Nigeria, the coverage of improved sanitation fell from 37 percent in 1990 to 28 
percent in 2012 (WHO and UNICEF 2014). That decline contrasts with the experience in other 
developing regions, such as South Asia, where the use of improved sanitation facilities 
                                                          
8 Accessed April 12, 2015 from http://data.unicef.org/water-sanitation/water. 
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increased by 19 percent since 1990, to reach 42 percent of the population in 2012. But some 
Sub-Saharan countries have expanded or upgraded sanitation, each year moving as much as 3 
percent of their population up the ladder to better forms of sanitation: Ethiopia has done so 
with unimproved latrines; Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and Rwanda, with improved latrines; and 
Senegal, with septic tanks (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). 
Information and telecommunications 
According to Lomas (2012), mobile phone networks have expanded rapidly in Africa, reaching 
80 percent of the population, up from only 2 percent in 2000. Those figures seem to be 
supported by the Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development and Task Group on World 
Summit on the Information Society (2014), which reported that mobile cellular signal coverage 
had improved to 79 percent of rural populations in Africa in 2012, up from only 23 percent in 
2003. Coverage is still, however, below the world average: 87 percent of the world’s rural 
population was covered by a mobile cellular signal in 2012, up from 76 percent in 2008 and 45 
percent in 2003. But Africa as a whole records the largest leap in cellular signal coverage, from 
about 23 percent of the population in 2003 to 88 percent in 2012. Africa is also developing new 
services, such as mobile money transfer—pioneered in East Africa—on its network platform 
(AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2014). Table 2.2 provides a summary of some statistics.  
Table 2.2: Rural access to mobile cellular connection. 
Region Overall mobile cellular 
coverage (%) 
Rural population 
covered (%) 
Rural population covered 
(millions) 
Rural population not 
covered (millions) 
Africa 88 79 498 129 
Americas 99 96 171 9 
Asia 92 87 2,017 309 
Europe 100 98 196 3 
Oceania 98 84 3 0.6 
World 93 87 2,886 451 
Source: Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development and Task Group on World Summit on the Information 
Society (2014). 
Internet connections have greatly improved, as well, since East, Southern, and West Africa 
were connected to subsea cables in the late 2000s (Lomas 2012). UNECA and AUC (2013) report 
that the number of Internet users in Africa increased by an average of 2 users for every 100 
inhabitants in 2011, in part from the increasing use of smartphones for Internet services. At the 
end of 2013, an estimated 2.7 billion people were using the Internet worldwide (Partnership on 
Measuring ICT for Development and Task Group on World Summit on the Information Society 
2014). Despite the apparent ubiquity of information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
their benefits are not uniformly experienced by the 7.1 billion people in the world. According 
to ITU (2014), more than 4 billion people worldwide—the majority of whom live in developing 
countries—do not yet have access to the Internet. Again, African countries lead the regions of 
the world where a 3G cellular signal is least available, with many Sub-Saharan countries 
reporting no 3G mobile cellular coverage for their rural populations (Partnership on Measuring 
ICT for Development and Task Group on World Summit on the Information Society 2014). 
African Union (2014) estimates that the Internet penetration rate for Sub-Saharan Africa was 
only 6 percent in 2012, compared with an average of 40 percent elsewhere in the developing 
world. 
Funding gap and financing strategies  
Several estimates have been made of the infrastructure funding gap in Sub-Saharan Africa, all 
of which paint a grim picture. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate that Africa needs 
some $80 billion a year to address its infrastructure deficit, about 30 percent for refurbishing 
14 
existing infrastructure and about 50 percent for the power sector. AfDB (2011a) estimates that 
about $93 billion (15 percent of GDP) per year is required to fix the infrastructure gap, about 
half of it in the power sector. With current infrastructure spending only about $45 billion a year, 
the financing gap clearly is sizable (AfDB 2013a). The African Union created the Programme for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) to, among other tasks, coordinate the effort to 
bridge Sub-Saharan Africa’s yawning infrastructure gap.9 PIDA estimates that the region’s 
infrastructure upgrading and modernization needs would cost $360 billion a year until 2040 
(2020 for ICT) and has developed a strategic framework that is expected to deliver 37,300 km 
of modern highways, 30,200 km of modern railways, 1.3 billion tons of added port capacity, 
61,099 MW of hydroelectric power, 16,500 km of interconnecting power lines, 20,101 hm3 
(cubic hectometers) of new water storage capacity, and 6 TB (terabytes) of ICT international 
broadband capacity (African Union 2014). 
Water and sanitation 
Funding requirements for specific infrastructure sectors are as huge as the overall 
requirements. For the water sector, for instance, UNECA (2006) estimates that on aggregate, 
$20 billion a year is required to achieve the targets of the Africa Water Vision 2025. To meet the 
Millennium Development Goals for water, Africa needs an estimated $16.5 billion a year 
(roughly 2.6 percent of its GDP). Although that cost looks prohibitive for many countries , it can 
be reduced through lower cost technologies, such as standposts and boreholes (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2010). Indeed, with lower cost technologies incorporated, AfDB (2011a) 
estimates the annual funding gap in the water sector at $11 billion, reporting that the sector is 
characterized by massive waste and loses between $1 billion (AfDB 2011a) and $2.7 billion 
(Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010) each year to operational inefficiencies of water utilities.  
Spending on the water sector today is $3.6 billion, one-fourth of what is required. Further, to 
meet the Millennium Development Goal target for sanitation, Sub-Saharan African countries 
need to spend an estimated 0.9 percent of GDP a year—0.7 percent for investment and 0.2 
percent for operation and maintenance (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). The researchers 
observe that households pay most of the investment bill, and governments contribute only a 
small fraction. Considerable health benefits arise from investments in sanitation, including 
substantial reductions in the incidence of diarrhea, intestinal worms, and trachoma.  
Power 
For the power sector, it is estimated that the Sub-Saharan region needed to spend an estimated 
$41 billion annually between 2005 and 2015, which includes $14 billion for  operations and 
maintenance, to achieve its desired levels of economic growth (Eberhard et al. 2011). Half of 
the remaining $27 billion is required to develop new generating capacity and a good part of the 
remainder to fund the rehabilitation of existing transmission and generation. But the region 
needs to address high inefficiencies that have, in the past, stifled investments in the power 
sector. For instance, only 66 percent of the capital budget allocation to power is actually spent, 
the rest being diverted to other budget items or reverting to the treasury at year -end. 
                                                          
9 PIDA’s objective is to accelerate the implementation of regional and continental infrastructure by 2040. PIDA will 
implement short-term and priority projects until 2020, medium-term projects between 2020 and 2030, and long-
term projects between 2030 and 2040. The PIDA priority action plan comprises the 51 PIDA programs and projects 
designed to address sector-specific, priority infrastructure deficits in energy, transport, ICT, and trans-boundary 
water (http://www.au-pida.org/pida-objectives, accessed March 10, 2015). See Annex 2 (p. 13) of PIDA (2014) for 
planned infrastructure projects for Africa. 
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Eberhard et al. (2011) also perform a scenario analysis and estimate that total annual costs of 
system expansion and operation are 4.2 percent of GDP under trade expansion and 4.4 percent 
under trade stagnation. The researchers explain that, although high, the overall cost of 
developing power systems is not unattainable relative to the trading region’s GDP. But AfDB 
(2013a) notes that mobilizing investments in the power sector (and other sectors) is difficult 
because of financially weak institutions that have an aggregate annual revenue shortfall of 
about $8 billion. 
Transport 
A cost-effective way to expand Africa’s power generation capacity, according to Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia (2010), is to pool primary energy resources across national boundaries 
through regional trade. Doing so could help cut the marginal cost of power generation by 
between $0.01 and $0.04 per kilowatt-hour, leading to aggregate savings in the costs of 
developing and operating the power system of about $2 billion a year. The authors suggest that 
operationalization of such an approach is possible if untapped hydropower in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Guinea were developed to export power to Southe rn, 
East, and West Africa, respectively, establishing about 22,000 megawatts of interconnectors 
over the 2005–2015 decade. 
Fay and Yepes (2003) estimate that annual infrastructure expenditure in developing countries 
is approximately 5.5 percent of GDP, of which roads development require about 19 percent, or 
an estimated 1 percent of GDP, excluding maintenance of existing road networks. Because of 
past underinvestment and poor maintenance, the figures would be slightly higher for Sub -
Saharan Africa. Indeed, Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate that a well-maintained 
two-lane network of about 100,000 km, of which about 70 percent is already in place, can serve 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional connectivity needs. But 25 percent of the existing network needs 
to be expanded to two lanes and the rest of it needs to be improved. 
The total cost of regional road connectivity is estimated at $2.7 billion a year, the bulk for 
investment. A further $2.9 billion a year, a good part of it for upgrading existing unpaved roads 
to paved roads, is required to achieve within-country connectivity. Additional requirements are 
approximately $2.5 billion per year for improvement and new investment in road networks in 
rural areas that have agricultural production potential, and $1.6 billion for roads in urban areas. 
Overall, a transport network with sufficient regional, national, rural, and urban road 
connectivity—accompanied by adequate rail, port, and airport infrastructure—requires 
approximately $18 billion a year, half of which is for maintenance (Foster and Briceño-
Garmendia 2010). 
Telecommunication 
Doh, Teegan, and Mudambi (2004) find that private investment is necessary to transform 
outmoded or incomplete telecommunications infrastructure systems. But investors are 
attracted to countries with weak telecommunication infrastructures if those countries support 
investment liberalization. Thus, state officials should recognize that a policy of retaining 
maximum state ownership is unlikely to attract private investments in the sec tor. Indeed, the 
private sector demonstrated a good appetite for investing in the submarine fiber -optic cable 
recently laid off the coast of many African countries. The submarine and intraregional fiber -
optic cable is expected to gobble up an annual private sector investment of less than $0.2 
billion. If the region were to achieve universal rural access—for both voice service and limited 
broadband service based on WiMAX technology—it would need an investment of $1.7 billion a 
year, with the public sector contribution amounting to only about $0.4 billion (Foster and 
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Briceño-Garmendia 2010).10 In sum, the estimated ICT sector annual investment need is $9 
billion, which includes $2 billion for maintenance and private sector investment to service 
existing urban demand (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010).  
Financing strategies 
Bridging the infrastructure financing gaps just discussed is important for Africa to enjoy 
economic prosperity. The bulk of current spending on infrastructure, about $30 billion 
annually—only one-third of which finances new projects—comes from domestic public sources 
(Cassel, de Candia, and Liberatore 2010). External infrastructure finance—ascribed largely to 
increased private capital flows (through public–private partnerships), development assistance, 
and South–South cooperation—increased five-fold, from $4 billion in 2002 to $20 billion in 2007 
(Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). In 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa received more than $55 
billion in new infrastructure investments (AfDB 2010). Investments by the Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa members rose from about $14 billion to almost $20 billion between 2008 
and 2009, attributed to improved business and policy environments (AfDB 2013b).  
Although private capital flow has been growing a lot in recent years, it almost entirely finances 
the telecommunication sector (75 percent) while neglecting other sectors, such as water and 
transport (Kauffmann 2008). The private sector’s lack of enthusiasm in financing Sub -Saharan 
Africa’s other infrastructure sectors is attributed to several factors, including lack of stable 
long-term finance, high sector-specific risks, and political instability and governance risks 
(Kandiero 2009). Unless action is taken to reduce those risks, private sector participation —
especially in the more critical power and transportation sectors—might remain suppressed. 
Official development assistance, which has tended to fill the infrastructure funding gap in the 
past (Hagerman 2012), increased from 8 percent in 2006 to 18 percent in 2008 (AfDB 2013b); 
however, many bilateral lenders are now shifting their focus to rural development and poverty 
reduction (Brautigam 2010). The funding gap left by these, traditionally OECD, lenders is to 
some extent being filled by nontraditional lenders, such as India, China, and Arab countries, 
which have increased their Sub-Saharan infrastructure commitments (Foster 2008) to an 
incredible $8 billion in 2006 from less than $1 billion a year in 2001 (Cassel, de Candia, and 
Liberatore 2010). 
In addition, many countries have recently begun to involve the private sector, via public –
private partnerships (PPPs), in financing infrastructure development needs. To be economically 
sensible, PPPs should generate a combination of allocative and productive efficiency  that is 
superior to an entirely public or entirely private project (Välilä 2005). PPPs’ strengths include 
improved service quality, risk sharing, better budget fulfillment, faster speed of construction, 
and improved completion rates; pitfalls include higher financing costs, less flexibility, 
complicated contracts, and hold-ups and reduced flexibility with long-term contracts 
(Alexandersson and Hultén 2007). 
The higher financing costs arise from the non-recourse or limited-recourse nature associated 
with project financing, which drives up credit risk (Utz 2013). In the case of Design-Build-
Operate and Design-Build-Operate-Transfer contracts, the higher costs are usually transferred 
to project users, which may adversely affect users’ access or welfare. Therefore, the public 
sector must remain important—as a direct financier, a catalyst for private investment, and the 
                                                          
10 WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is a standardized, wireless version of Ethernet 
intended primarily as an alternative to wire technologies (such as cable modems, DSL, and T1/E1 links) to provide 
broadband access to customer premises (http://www.tutorialspoint.com/wimax/what_is_wimax.htm, accessed 
April 7, 2015). 
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party in charge of addressing externalities, inefficiencies, and maintenance of infrastructure 
assets (AfDB 2013a). 
Infrastructure financing’s capacity and efficiency issues  
According to Foster (2008), every $1 spent on preventive road maintenance saves $4 in 
rehabilitation. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) report that Africa loses about $17 billion 
annually to various inefficiencies in infrastructure operations or spending, The authors identify 
several opportunities for efficiency gains, including improving budget execution rates; 
reallocating existing budgets to subsectors with the highest economic returns, such as power; 
raising user charges closer to cost-recovery levels; and reducing operating inefficiencies of 
utilities to prevent waste and promote service quality. AfDB (2013b) argues that capacity and 
inefficiency issues can be addressed by reforming and supporting the evolution of institu tions 
charged with managing and developing infrastructure. The report suggests that institutional 
advancements can be fostered by improving spending efficiency, enlarging the regional 
approach to infrastructure investment, and improving the regulatory framework. Our study 
seeks to understand the exact nature of institutional capacities (or lack thereof) that may have 
led to suboptimal infrastructure financing in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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CHAPTER 3. INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
To empirically explore the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa, we use a methodology proposed by Calderón and Servén (2004). Thus, to begin, 
we use principal components analysis to construct a representative infrastructure stock index 
from three variables, commonly used in the literature, that represent what is considered core 
infrastructure for developing countries (see, for example, Calderón and Servén 2010): 
telecommunication (number of main telephone lines per 1,000 people), power (the economy’s 
electricity-generating capacity, in MW per 1,000 people), and transportation (the road 
network’s length, in km. per sq. km. of land area).  
Data and descriptive statistics 
Although some variables (such as road network length) are not available in lon g or consistent 
time series, their availability for cross-sections is sufficient to provide adequate information for 
the index. We use the entire pooled sample of 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to run the 
principal components analysis, with the power variable expressed in logarithmic form.11 The 
second principal component provides the best weights for our index construction. 12 The 
resulting index, a linear combination of the three underlying metrics, is derived as follows:  
INFS=0.888(TELs)+0.949(POWs)+0.125(TRAs)     (1) 
where TELs, POWs, and TRAs are, respectively, metrics for telecommunications, power, and 
transport stocks, as described previously, and INFS is the index of infrastructure stocks.  
The infrastructure quality index is similarly constructed from three variables: 
telecommunications (secure Internet per 100 people13), power (percentage of transmission and 
distribution losses in the production of electricity), and transport (the share of p aved roads in 
total roads). Using the first principal component, we use the following linear transformation 
to develop the infrastructure quality index (INFq):  
INFQ=0.349(TELq)+0.766(POWq)+0.541(TRAq)     (2) 
where TELq, POWq, and TRAq are, respectively, the metrics for telecommunications, power, 
and transport quality. The indexes compare well with the underlying infrastructure variables, 
as seen in the pairwise correlations, reported in table 3.1.  
                                                          
11 The countries studied are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
12 The best principal component is defined as the one that provides the set of weights that yields an index with the 
highest correlation with each index component. 
13 Waiting time for telephone main lines has been used in previous studies. But this variable is not available (in the 
WDI database) for African countries. 
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Table 3.1: Correlations between synthetic infrastructure indices and infrastructure variables 
 Infrastructure stock 
index (INFS) 
 Infrastructure quality 
index (INFQ) 
Telecommunications (number of main telephone 
lines per 1,000 people) 0.1081 
  
Power (economy’s electricity-generating capacity, in 
MW per 1,000 people) 0.5415 
  
Transportation (the road network length, in km, per 
square km of land area) 0.9521 
  
Telecommunications (secure Internet per 100 
people)  
 0.9193 
Power (percentage of transmission and distribution 
losses in the production of electricity)  
 0.6375 
Transport (share of paved roads in total roads)   0.6825 
Note: Correlations are run on pooled annual data of 40 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2011. Data 
are obtained the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The infrastructure stock index is constructed 
as INFS=0.888(TELs)+0.949(POWs)+0.125(TRAs) and the infrastructure quality index as 
INFQ=0.349(TELq)+0.766(POWq)+0.541(TRAq); the lower case “s” and “q” in the formulae represent stock 
and quality, respectively; TEL, POW, and TRA represent telecommunication, power, and transport metrics, 
respectively, as defined in the table. The variable “electricity-generating capacity of the economy, in MW per 
1,000 people” is in logarithmic form. Index weights are derived from the second and first principal 
components, respectively, for the stock and quality indexes. 
Most data for this study comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
GDP growth, the independent variable, is constructed as the log of the ratio  of GDP per capita 
in period t to GDP per capita in period t-1. The explanatory variables are lagged values of the 
log of GDP per capita (GPC); government spending as a proportion of GDP, coded GVS; trade 
openness (OPN) defined as the ratio of total trade to GDP; governance (REG), proxied by the 
perception of regulatory quality index; inflation (INF) defined as the rate of change in the 
consumer price index; and the two infrastructure indexes. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics  
 GPC GVS OPN FDV TOT REG INF HDI INFS INFQ 
Mean 6.509 0.332 4.229 3.291 1.096 -0.648 3.252 0.455 19.836 21.835 
Median 6.175 0.257 4.203 3.248 1.000 -0.589 1.492 0.443 21.155 13.967 
Std. deviation 1.108 0.259 0.470 0.632 0.359 0.620 12.553 0.113 26.346 38.340 
Minimum 4.910 0.016 3.043 0.481 0.212 -2.260 -9.824 0.262 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 9.548 1.515 5.381 5.021 2.552 0.898 263.0 0.783 186.36 462.99 
Missing obs. 0 14 0 14 0 39 0 4 0 0 
Pairwise correlations          
GPC 1.000          
GVS 0.318 1.000         
OPN 0.575 0.192 1.000        
FDV 0.374 0.893 0.266 1.000       
TOT 0.108 -0.196 0.068 -0.188 1.000      
REG 0.410 0.090 0.053 0.259 -0.020 1.000     
INF -0.013 -0.060 -0.051 -0.194 -0.015 -0.087 1.000    
HDI 0.845 0.567 0.510 0.616 0.012 0.381 -0.066 1.000   
INFS 0.183 0.132 0.089 0.172 0.101 0.123 0.006 0.135 1.000  
INFQ 0.421 0.152 0.324 0.183 -0.085 0.108 -0.047 0.404 0.206 1.000 
Note: The statistics are obtained from pooled data of 40 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2011, 
obtained from United Nations Development Program (for HDI) and World Development Indicators for the 
rest of the data. GPC is GDP per capita in logs; GVS is ratio of government spending to GDP; OPN is trade 
openness, constructed as the share of GDP of total value of external trade; FDV is the log of credit to the 
private sector to GDP; TOT is terms of trade, constructed as value of exports to value of imports; REG is the 
perception of regulatory quality (a proxy for governance); INF is the rate of inflation, constructed from the 
consumer price index; HDI is the Human Development Index (some missing value extrapolated as a linear 
function of time); INFS and INFQ are infrastructure indices, as described in table 3.1. Missing variables are 
skipped in our computations. 
Also included, as a control variable, is human capital, surrogated by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), whose components are 
life expectancy, gross national income per capita, and expected years of schooling. The index 
was changed in 2010; previously, the standard of living (log GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity) and school enrollment rates were used in place of national income and the two “years 
of schooling” variables, respectively. The HDI are not available for several years. To fill the 
observation gaps, we first estimate the 2009 index as the arithmetic mean of 2008 and 2010 
indices, and then we run an ordinary least squares regression of HDI indices for 2008 –2013 
against time and intercept. The regressions yield a (highly) significant time coefficient in 38 of 
40 countries. Assuming linearity between HDI and time, we then extrapolate HDI data for 2001–
2004. Descriptive statistics for the entire data set are in table 3.2.  
The maximum values of the two infrastructure indexes are fairly high. An examination shows 
that those values relate to South Africa, whose infrastructure is relatively more advanced than 
that of the rest of the region; that makes South Africa an outlier in the panel. Therefore, we 
run our empirical tests initially with all 40 countries in the panel, including South Africa, and 
then exclude South Africa in the subsequent (robustness) test. Terms of trade statistics show 
that, for the median country in the region, all the revenues from exports are used  to finance 
imports. But because most of these countries export unprocessed commodities, the bulk of 
imports are likely to be consumables rather than raw materials for production. By that logic, at 
this preliminary stage, terms of trade seem to be unfavorable to growth. A final observation 
regards missing variables. Data are scarce on several of our variables for the Sub -Saharan 
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region. But that does not affect the validity of our empirical results, as missing data have been 
dealt with scientifically. Second, in the robustness test, we exclude Rwanda and Zimbabwe, 
which have the highest number of missing observations. 
Empirical strategy 
To understand the infrastructure provision’s effect on economic growth, we use annual data 
for the period 2000–2012 to test the following augmented growth model on a panel of 40 Sub-
Saharan African countries:14 
∆y_it= αy_(i,t-1)+ β_1^' X_it+ β_2^' Z_it+ θ_t+ μ_i+ ε_it     (3) 
where ∆y is the growth in GDP per capita; X is the vector of standard growth or inequality 
determinants, including output per capita, financial depth, government spending, trade 
openness, human capital, governance, inflation, and terms of trade; Z is a vector of 
infrastructure-related measures, including indices and variables of stock of infrastructure and 
quality of infrastructure; θ_t and μ_i are unobserved time - and country-specific effects, 
respectively; α is the convergence coefficient; and ε_it is noise. Because of potential 
endogeneity in the data, estimation will be done through the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), using procedures proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) 
for dynamic panel data models. The procedure controls for endogeneity through instrumental 
variables: we use suitable lags of the explanatory variables, in the spirit of Arellano and Bond 
(1991), as instruments.15 The system GMM that we use treats unobserved country-specific 
factors through differencing. Our estimation procedure includes period-specific dummies to 
control for homogeneous factors that may affect the economic growth of the countries 
investigated. Missing observations are treated as suggested by the Gretl Software Users’ 
Guide, 2015.16 
Estimation results  
Parameters of the system GMM estimates of the growth equation augmented by infrastructure 
quality and stock are reported in table 3.3. The table carries parameter estimates of 
infrastructure metrics, as well as parameter estimates for control variables generally agreed in 
the literature as standard growth explainers. The regression includes an intercept and time 
dummies to control for factors common to all the countries. 
The results show that trade openness, terms of trade, governance (proxied by regulatory 
quality), inflation (percentage change in the consumer price index), and huma n capital 
significantly and positively affect economic growth. The coefficients of inflation 
unconventionally carry a positive sign: an increment in the price of consumer goods and 
services, if pushed by demand, could elicit an increment in economic output, which contributes 
positively to economic growth. Both infrastructure indicators yield positive coefficients, as 
expected. The infrastructure quality significantly informs growth in the Sub-Saharan African 
region. The stock of infrastructure index yields insignificant coefficients in our estimates. This 
result contradicts the public capital hypothesis, which postulates that the stock of public 
                                                          
14 Serious attempts at incorporating the private sector in infrastructure financing started with market reforms in 
the mid-1990s. This investigation seeks to capture the relationships of interest post-reforms. Similarly, there is 
data paucity before 2000 for many small economies in the region. Other related studies have investigated specific 
countries in the region, such as Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson 1999), Sudan (Badawi 2003), and South Africa 
(Bogetic and Fedderke 2005). 
15 Although infrastructure quality and stock might be weakly exogenous, Calderón and Servén (2010) have shown 
that using internal instruments works as well as using a combination of internal and external instruments. 
16 http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/pub/gretl/manual/en/gretl-guide-a4.pdf (see p. 164; accessed June 10, 2015). 
30 
 
Les valeurs maximales des deux indices pour les infrastructures sont assez élevées. Une analyse 
approfondie montre que ces valeurs se rapportent à l'Afrique du Sud, dont les infrastructures 
sont relativement plus avancées que celle du reste de la région (Afrique du Sud est donc un cas 
aberrant). Par conséquent, les tests empiriques sont effectués initialement avec tous les 40 pays 
de l’échatillion, y compris l'Afrique du Sud, et ensuite sans l'Afrique du Sud dans les tests de 
robustesse. Les statistiques concernant les termes de l'échange montrent que, pour les pays 
médians, toutes les recettes provenant des exportations sont utilisées pour financer les 
importations. Toutefois étant donné que la plupart de ces pays exportent des produits de base 
non transformés, la majeure partie des importations sont susceptibles d'être des produits de 
consommation plutôt que des matières premières pour la production. Selon cette logique, et à 
ce stade d’analyse préliminaire, les termes de l'échange semblent être défavorables à la 
croissance. Les variables manquantes également méritent une attention. Les données 
disponibles pour l’Afrique subsaharienne sont rares pour plusieurs variablesà la. Cela n'affecte 
cependant pas la validité des résultats empiriques, dans la mesure où le problème des données 
manquantes a été traité de manièr  scien ifique. Par ailleurs, le Rwanda et le Zimb bwe qui ont 
le plus grand nombre de données manquantes ont été exclus de l’échantillon lors des tests de 
robustesse. 
 
Stratégie empirique 
Afin de comprendre l'effet des infrastructures sur la croissance économique, les données 
annuelles de 40 pays de l’Afrique subsaharienne sur la période 2000-2012 sont utilisées pour 
tester le modèle de croissance augmenté suivant : 14 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 +  𝛽𝛽1
′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2
′ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (3) 
 
où ∆y est la croissance du PIB par habitant ; X est le vecteur pour les déterminants de la 
croissance ou de l'inégalité, comprenant la production par habitant, la profondeur du marché 
financier, les dépenses publiques, l'ouverture commerciale, le capital humain, la gouvernance, 
l'inflation, et les termes de l'échange ; Z est un vecteur des indicateurs liées aux infrastructures, 
y compris des indices et des vari bles sur le stock et la qualité des i frastructures ; 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 sont 
ment les effets on-observés propres au temps et au pays ; α est le coefficient de 
convergence ; et 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  est le terme d’erreur. En raison d’une possible en ogénéité des données, 
les estimations seront effectuées par le biais de la méthode des moments généralisée (GMM), 
en utilisant l’approche proposée par Arellano et Bond (1991) et Arellano et Bover (1995) pour les 
modèles dynamiques des données de panel. Cette méthode prend en compte le problème de 
l’endogénéité par le biais des variables instrumentales. Les retards des variables explicatives 
sont utilisés en tant qu'instruments.15  Le système GMM tient en compte des facteurs non 
observées propres aux pays à travers la méthode de la différenciation. La procédure d'estimation 
utilisée comprend des variables muettes temporelles propres aux périodes afin de prendre en 
compte les facteurs homogènes qui pourraient avoir un effet sur la croissance économique des 
pays faisant l’objet de l’étude. Les observations manquantes sont traitées tel que suggéré par le 
                                                          
14 Les tentatives de faire participer le secteur privé dans le financement des infrastructures ont serieusement 
commencé avec les réformes du marché au milieu des années 1990. La présente étude vise à saisir les relations 
post-réformes. Par ailleurs, la disponibilité des données avant 2000 faisait défaut pour plusieurs économies de petite 
taille de la région. D'autres études ont analysé des pays spécifiques dans la région, tels que l'Ouganda (Reinikka et 
Svensson, 1999), le Soudan (Badawi, 2003) et l'Afrique du Sud (Bogetic et Fedderke 2005). 
15 Bien que la qualité et le stock des infrastructures puissent être faiblement exogènes, Calderón et Servén (2010) 
ont montré que l'utilisation d'instruments internes fonctionne aussi bien que celle d'une combinaison d'instruments 
internes t externes. 
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capital has a significant positive effect on private sector output, productivity, and capital 
formation (Ayogu 2007); it also contradicts some studies that find that infrastructure 
investments significantly affect economic growth positively. For instance, Akinbobola and 
Saibu (2004) find that spending on infrastructure development leads to more job 
opportunities, higher level of income per capita, and a reduction in poverty in Nigeria; similarly, 
Fedderke, Perkins, and Luiz (2005) find for South Africa that investment in infrastructure leads 
growth by raising marginal productivity of capital. More recently, Calderón an d Servén (2010) 
find that infrastructure stocks (proxied using a synthetic index roughly similar to ours) highly 
significantly and positively influence economic growth. 
Given those findings and the well-known underinvestment in infrastructure in the region, one 
would expect that a marginal change in the stock of infrastructure should elicit economic 
growth. But our finding that a change in the stock of infrastructure does not stimulate 
economic growth in the region finds support from several studies. To begin, the results of 
Fedderke, Perkins, and Luiz (2005) are not robust to alternative measures, principally physical 
infrastructure. Similarly, the study by Easterly and Levine (1997)—although finding a strong, 
positive link between growth and some infrastructure indicators (mostly quality indicators, 
such as telephones per worker, percent of roads that are paved, and the percent of 
transmission losses in the electricity system)—fails to support the argument that the 
infrastructure quantity (such as kilometers of roads per worker and electricity-generating 
capacity per worker) drive the continent’s economic growth.  
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Table 3.3: Empirical results 
 Baseline regression 
(40 Sub-Saharan countries) 
 Excluding Rwanda, South Africa,  
and Zimbabwe 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3  Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6 
Constant  0.377*** 
(0.09) 
0.303*** 
(0.11) 
0.351*** 
(0.12) 
 0.257** 
(0.11) 
0.285** 
(0.12) 
0.331*** 
(0.12) 
Lagged GDP per capita 0.885*** 
(0.04) 
0.904*** 
(0.11) 
0.887*** 
(0.05) 
 0.878*** 
(0.05) 
0.877*** 
(0.05) 
0.864*** 
(0.05) 
Government spending  0.031 
(0.04) 
0.030 
(0.05) 
0.027 
(0.05) 
 −0.064 
(0.04) 
−0.075 
(0.05) 
0.054 
(0.05) 
Trade openness 0.039** 
(0.02) 
0.035* 
(0.02) 
0.040* 
(0.02) 
 0.042** 
(0.02) 
0.051** 
(0.03) 
0.054** 
(0.03) 
Financial depth −0.058*** 
(0.01) 
−0.045** 
(0.02) 
−0.053*** 
(0.02) 
 −0.030* 
(0.02) 
−0.028 
(0.02) 
−0.035* 
(0.02) 
Terms of trade 0.024** 
(0.01) 
0.029** 
(0.01) 
0.027** 
(0.01) 
 0.020* 
(0.01) 
0.033** 
(0.01) 
0.028** 
(0.01) 
Governance (regulatory quality) 0.043*** 
(0.01) 
0.037*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
 0.018 
(0.01) 
0.023 
(0.02) 
0.023 
(0.02) 
Inflation 0.001** 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001* 
(0.00) 
 −0.001 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
−0.000 
(0.00) 
Human development index 0.911*** 
(0.35) 
0.711** 
(0.36) 
0.850** 
(0.40) 
 0.796** 
(0.40) 
0.913** 
(0.43) 
1.015** 
(0.44) 
Infrastructure stock 0.002 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.002 
(0.00)  
0.002 
(0.00) 
Infrastructure quality   0.002** 
(0.00) 
0.002** 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.003*** 
(0.00) 
Observations 387 387 387  368 368 368 
Specification tests (p-values) 
AR(2)  0.16 0.17 0.15  0.16 0.17 0.17 
Sargan 0.87 0.98 0.88  0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note: We estimate a system GMM using annual data of 40 countries (equations 1–3) and 37 countries 
(equations 4–6) for the period 2000–2011. The dependent variable is growth in GDP (log of the ratio of GDP 
per capita in year t and GDP per capita in year t-1). The regression includes an intercept and time dummies; 
robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent, respectively. 
Infrastructure plays an important role in augmenting productivity and output, hence, in raising 
the rate of return on private capital. This augmentation leads to higher private investment, 
hence, output. Infrastructure quality coefficients are all  positive and significant in our 
estimates. These results, therefore, suggest that emphasis should be placed not on providing 
the infrastructure bulk but on ensuring that public infrastructure is of the standard that can 
increase the rate of return on private capital and, hence, augment productivity. For instance, 
the provision of electric power is important in encouraging private investment. But if the power 
supply is unreliable—say, due to a high frequency of outages—private entrepreneurs will be 
forced to have alternative and expensive stand-by arrangements (such as thermal generators), 
which reduces the return on their invested capital (Malikane 2014).  
Similarly, the existence of a long road network might not be useful in attracting private capital 
if a substantial part of the network is effectively unusable because of the roads’ bad state of 
repair. Our thesis, therefore, is that the quality of infrastructure matters for economic growth, 
even in countries that are relatively less endowed with infrastructure stocks, such as those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. To test the veracity of this thesis, we run additional tests that exclude 
South Africa (due to its relatively better infrastructure stocks endowment) and Rwanda and 
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Zimbabwe (which have the greatest number of missing observations). Additional test results, 
reported in table 3.3 (equations 4–6), show that our findings on the infrastructure-economic 
growth nexus are robust to alternative panel compositions and missing observations. The 
robustness of these results to regional country clusters, as well as additional tests on the 
relationships found here, are being investigated in a longer paper dedicated to that analysis   
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CHAPTER 4. INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING CAPACITY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
To gather evidence on the private sector’s participation in infrastructure financing in Sub -
Saharan Africa, and on the adequacy of its institutional and human resource capacity, we used 
a case study approach. We sampled three countries—South Africa, Mauritius, and Kenya—
examining the relative state of development of their capital markets and infrastructure. The 
AfDB, OECD, and UNDP (2013) rank South Africa, Kenya, and Mauritius, in that order, as the 
three African countries with the greatest depth of financial markets, and Mauritiu s and South 
Africa as the second and fourth best, respectively, in infrastructure development. Thus, those 
countries are likely the best cases of private sector involvement in the region’s infrastructure 
financing. 
This section reports results of primary data relating to capacity issues of infrastructure 
financing in Africa. The questionnaire, provided in the appendix, details the nature of questions 
posed to respondents. The mostly open-ended questions allow respondents latitude to be as 
detailed as possible. Most data gathered was therefore nonstructured and nonnumeric. We 
use thematic analysis to interpret the data and make inferences. We conducted our inquiry in 
Kenya, Mauritius, and South Africa and, accordingly, report our findings separately for each 
country. 
Kenya 
Given the short time available, we reached only 17 respondents in Kenya, 6 from the public 
sector. The following pages summarize the responses to the study’s key questions. We present 
our results within five capacity themes: capital markets,  public–private partnerships, spending 
of infrastructure allocations, human resources and processes, and information technology.  
Capital markets and infrastructure financing capacity 
Table 4.1 summarizes the responses to the key questions that seek to determine whether 
capital markets in Kenya can enable financing of public infrastructure:  
As a follow-up to question 5 in table 4.1, respondents were asked whether using one platform 
or exchange for the trade of debt and equity securities presented challenges to traders or to 
the exchange’s management. Most respondents, as expected, indicated that, because of the 
small size (by traded volumes) of the two major asset classes, creating separate trading 
platforms would result in suboptimal use of those markets. But some respondents explained 
that settlement and clearing of traded equity securities took place at the Central Depository 
System, whereas bond trading was cleared and settled at the Central Bank of Kenya. According 
to those respondents, that dichotomy could present managerial complexities were the 
exchange to increase its turnover, as coordinating clearance might be difficult. Furthermore, 
respondents explained that bond prices were, in practice, largely negotiated “over the 
counter” among institutional investors, who are the main investor group, and then merely 
authenticated—for settlement purposes—at the automated trading system, which is the 
formal trading platform. This “parallel trade” system introduced information asymmetry to 
bond trading, which reduced the efficacy of the exchange’s price discovery mechanism. The 
respondents wisely suggested that an over-the-counter market should be created to deal with 
the challenge. 
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Table 4.1: Capital market capacity responses—Kenya 
 Dominant 
response 
Proportion and 
percentage of 
respondents 
1. Is there a well-developed public capital market in the country that can 
enable the government (central and local) to issue debt securities to 
finance infrastructure needs? 
YES 
 
16/17 
 
0.94 
2. Has the public debt market for federal/national, state or county, and 
municipal debt issues been formalized in the country? 
YES 17/17 
 
1.00 
3. Has the formalized public debt market been extended to issuances by 
private issuers (companies and institutions)? 
YES 17/17 1.00 
4. Are issuances of debt by public and private entities considered 
important asset classes for investment purposes by investors in the 
country? 
YES 14/17 
 
0.82 
5. Is the debt market trading on the same platform as the national stock 
exchange? 
YES 17/17 1.00 
6. Is the exchange modern and feted with sufficient ICT infrastructure? YES 17/17 1.00 
To help examine the country’s public debt market, respondents were asked if borrowers 
adequately used the exchange. Most respondents reported great demand for debt instruments 
in Kenya. Demand especially exists from such institutional investors as pension funds, 
insurance firms, and savings and credit cooperative societies—some of which can, by law, 
invest up to 70 percent of their holdings in fixed-income instruments. As evidence of the 
demand, all bond issues at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) have been oversubscribed, 
with investor appetite going beyond national borders.17 But demand has not been sufficiently 
matched by supply of public debt, particularly by the corporate sector. Respondents ascribed 
potential corporate issuers’ lack of enthusiasm for the public debt markets to at least one of 
the following: 
• Excess liquidity in the commercial banking sector.  Several respondents explained that 
commercial banks in Kenya are awash with liquidity and are willing to offer interest 
rates, as low as—and sometimes lower than—the prevailing rates for Treasury bills to 
institutional borrowers. If public debt securities are to be priced well, especially with 
Treasury issues of the same maturity profile as the default risk benchmark, corporate 
bond issuers will not likely be able to obtain long-term, arms-length credit at interest 
rates lower than those offered by commercial banks. 
• Stringent public listing requirements and disclosure phobia.  Many private companies 
find abiding by the debt listing requirements difficult. Among other things, potential 
private debt issuers are required by pertinent regulations to have paid -up capital of 
KES 15 million (approximately USD 160,000); hold net assets of KES 10 million (USD 
107,000); maintain healthy leverage ratios; and file financial reports quarterly, post 
listing, with the Capital Markets Authority. Many potential issuers consider those 
listing requirements stringent, onerous, and costly and would rather negotiate loan 
terms discretely, with private lending houses. 
• Commercial banks’ domination in the public debt markets.  Because of their preference 
for short-term maturities (to match their liabilities), commercial banks, which 
dominate the demand side of the public debt markets, tend to discourage issuances of 
long-term debt instruments. That forces potential corporate long-term debt issuers to 
                                                          
17 Foreign investors currently hold nearly 55 percent of all outstanding bonds. 
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resort to private debt for long-term funding. The same commercial banks are likely the 
key beneficiaries of such private debt arrangements.18 
• Illiquidity in the corporate bond markets and long settlement time. The corporate bond 
counter at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) records only an average of 2 trades 
per month, compared to an average of 100 trades for Treasury bonds. The low trade 
volume introduces illiquidity in the corporate bonds market, which inhibits price 
discovery and discourages issuance. In some markets, dealers or market makers stand 
ready to buy back bonds in the secondary markets and provide liquidity; that has not 
taken root in the NSE. The long settlement time, currently averaging t + 5 days, and 
inferior DVP technology relative to advanced markets also hinder secondary trading 
and price discovery.19 
• Difficulties in pricing bond issues. Markets in which short, intermediate, and long-tenure 
Treasury securities are available help develop the yield curve and usually act as the 
benchmark for corporate bond pricing. But the Kenyan government has frequently had 
to deal with biting budget deficits, which have sometimes made Treasury bills rates 
erratic and hence incapable of providing a reasonable benchmark for short -term debt. 
Moreover, because long-term debt’s demand and supply must respond to changes in 
debt market conditions, their yields are also erratic and incapable of providing reliable, 
stable signals to corporate bond issuers. 
• Lack of a bond index. A bond index, which the NSE has not had, is necessary to gauge 
the health of bond markets. Recently, however, the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
launched a bond index at the Kenyan bourse. 
Implications for infrastructure financing capacity 
The hindrances to corporate bond issues are important to infrastructure financing. 
Respondents generally agreed that the Kenyan government recognizes the need to avoid 
crowding out the private sector from capital markets. Consequently, the government has 
increasingly turned to sources other than the local capital markets to meet public 
infrastructure financing needs. For instance, the government recently issued a Eur obond to 
finance power and transport infrastructure, which was oversubscribed by more than 150 
percent.20 Clearly, the absence of corporate issuers in the bond market interferes with the 
capacity to optimally use local capital markets to finance public infrastructure.21 
Asset-backed securities (ABS) 
The evolution of an asset-backed securities platform, which can easily support ring-fenced 
public issues such as infrastructure bonds, has been slow. Although a legal framework is in 
place, some respondents thought that the framework has borrowed too heavi ly from 
                                                          
18 Other than using commercial banks, Kenyan corporates typically obtain long-term credit from leasing agents or 
roll over short-term debt, such as commercial paper and trade credit. 
19 Delivery versus payment (DVP) is a technology used in bond trading. It is designed to suit institutional investors, 
who would ordinarily hesitate to pay for an asset or security before it is in negotiable form. 
20 http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Infrastructure-bond-bids-pass-target-by-Sh24bn/-/539546/2497334/-
/d0f0yqz/-/index.html (accessed June 8, 2015). 
21 Some respondents thought that the duty of physical infrastructure financing should not rest with the central 
government but with state-owned bodies (parastatals), such as Kenya Roads Board, Kenya Ports Authority (for 
transport infrastructure), and Kenya Electricity Generating Company (for power infrastructure), among others. In 
that regard, the respondents observed that the parastatals preferred negotiated financing (with foreign 
governments and banks). Were those subnationals and parastatals encouraged to access the local bond market by 
issuing municipal and agency bonds, the domestic public debt market would be deepened and become capable of 
supporting the financing of huge capital projects. 
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developed markets. In particular, the ABS Regulations 2007, which provided for securitization 
through a special purpose vehicle, was criticized as an American model that had little relevance 
to a nascent capital market such as Kenya’s. In response,  the Capital Markets Authority 
undertook amendments to the regulation. The result was the newly issued ABS Regulation 
2013, which allowed for securitization through a trust. But, in some ways, the new regulation 
has been a nightmare to implement. For instance, the mother institution transfers assets to the 
trust through a transaction at arm’s length, which attracts value -added tax (VAT). Because VAT 
was already paid on the original transaction, the result amounts to double taxation for the ABS 
originator. Thus, to close an ABS deal, one must first seek VAT exemption from the Treasury, a 
step that transaction advisors and potential ABS issuers regard as time consuming and 
unnecessary. 
Non–capital market sources of infrastructure financing 
Given local capital markets’ lack of capacity to enable the government to adequately finance 
infrastructure projects, respondents suggested several nontraditional financing options:  
• Islamic bonds. The government could issue debt instruments that target institutions 
operating on Islamic financial principles. The law governing issuance of financial 
instruments was recently amended to accommodate Islamic financial instruments.  
• Infrastructure bond issuance in international capital markets. Twice, the government 
has done this successfully. But those two issuances are not infrastructure bonds in the 
strict sense of the phrase because cash flows to bondholders are not based on the ring-
fencing concept, in which cash flows are derived solely from proceeds from the specific 
infrastructure project being financed. 
• Diaspora bonds issued to target Kenya’s diaspora in foreign markets.  Such issuances 
need to be ring-fenced to distinguish them from general-obligation bonds and to instill 
confidence in the diaspora community that cash flows will be based on the specific 
infrastructure project’s performance, while still backed by the government’s credit.  
• Earmarked fees. The respondents who suggested this option put a caveat on the fees’ 
suitability to finance large infrastructure outlays, citing the need to base them on 
economic performance. But earmarked fees might be useful for infrastructure 
maintenance support. 
• Donor support. Governments can negotiate with bilateral lenders to support specific 
infrastructure projects. Respondents also said that the cost of donor funding far 
outweighs the cost of issuing securities in the markets, notwithstanding the traditional 
challenges of terms and conditionalities. 
• Arranging project finance with commercial banks. Governments can assist in assembling 
consortiums of investors, lenders, and other participants to finance infrastructure 
projects too large for a single investor to underwrite.  
Respondents also noted that the government might not be able to fully use those alternative 
sources because of debt-sustainability concerns. The current total debt-to-GDP ratio is 48 
percent, and parliamentary approval is needed to exceed that limit. An emerging way of 
addressing that shortcoming is the public–private partnership (PPP) arrangement. 
Capacity to finance infrastructure through PPPs 
Kenya’s private sector is an important contributor to the country’s GDP—vibrant and 
connected to cross-border business partners. In that regard, the government has extended 
support to the sector in various forms, including tax exemptions (such as that bond investors 
are exempted from withholding taxes to encourage corporate bond issues), provision of an 
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enabling business environment (such as that, licensing requirements have been simplified) and 
tax subsidies (such as to encourage the production of tradable commodities in the export 
processing zones). Furthermore, the government now partners with the private sector to 
realize Kenya’s infrastructure objectives. To that end, the government enacted the Public–
Private Partnerships (PPP) Act in 2013 and has since put in place an elaborate PPP operational 
framework and established a PPP Unit as a national Treasury department.  
The PPP Unit was formed soon after the enactment of the PPP Act to promote and oversee 
implementation of the government’s PPP programs. The unit plays a key role in identifying 
problems; making recommendations to the PPP Committee regarding potential solutions; and 
ensuring that projects meet such quality criteria as affordability, value for money, and 
appropriate transfer of risk.22 According to a respondent, since its establishment, the unit has 
initiated 69 projects, which are at various stages, but none have been concluded. Respondents 
attributed the slow progress to the many layers of approval required before a deal can be 
concluded. But the country is not new to the PPP concept, having used it long before 2013 to 
finance several projects, such as replacement of the old Nyali Bridge, the Rift V alley Railway 
(awarded to a concessionaire by the Kenyan and Ugandan governments), and the independent 
power producers. Other more successful PPPs are the new Greenfield Terminal at the Jomo 
Kenyatta International Airport, the Mombasa Ferry Services (currently concessionaire 
operated), Kenyatta University hospital and hostel projects, and equipment lease by the 
Ministry of Health. 
According to the respondents, the government has not optimally used the private sector to 
achieve Kenya’s infrastructure objectives. First, the legislative framework is cumbersome 
because it places PPP coordination in the control of several disparate agencies and introduces 
system red tape that delays project implementation. Second, cumbersome procurement 
procedures encourage corrupt practices. Third, too much time has been devoted to feasibility 
studies, which often provide conflicting findings and can lead to even more studies. Fourth, 
project planning is poor, especially as it appertains to the appropriate PPP model’s funding 
mode and design. 
Fifth, land issues related to relocation, compensation, and absorption of local inhabitants into 
the project must be surmounted before a project can be given the green light. Respondents 
explain that, in some cases, communities have protested and demanded higher compensation, 
especially when they have not been adequately consulted before the project. In other cases, 
informed land speculators and profiteers (sometimes government insiders or their 
accomplices) have moved ahead of the government to purchase land at the project’s 
earmarked location only to sell it to the government for exorbitant prices. Sixth, security 
concerns—especially arising from fears of terrorist attacks—and subsequent travel advisories 
often have derailed PPP negotiations. Finally, transaction advisors and arrangers are in short 
supply in the Kenyan market. The government needs to recruit internal technical personnel to 
run the PPP Unit in the long term. Technical expertise has been sought from other countries 
and through secondments from supranational institutions, such as the World Bank. 
All respondents agreed that the Kenyan government is capable of running several PPPs at the 
same time. But some respondents thought that the government should run only one PPP 
project at a time for each major economic sector. Others suggested that the government could 
run as many PPP projects as possible provided the value-for-money conditions were met. 
Respondents suggested that a thorough value-for-money analysis must be undertaken and any 
                                                          
22 http://www.pppunit.go.ke/about-pppu/background (accessed May 2, 2015). 
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envisaged projects yielding negative value dropped. But respondents claimed that PPPs 
initiated and managed jointly with state-owned enterprises stood a better chance of success 
than those managed through special purpose vehicles because the former are more 
independent and better placed to bring experts on board. Some respondents indicated that 
the question should not be about the number of projects but rather the quality of projects that 
are best implemented through the PPP structure. Because project identification is crucial, well-
prepared feasibility studies are critical. The capacity to competently identify projects might be 
limited initially, but in the interim, government can draw on the technical backstopping of 
external advisors as it builds its own capacity. 
Respondents also believe that the government can provide guarantees on all 69 envisaged PPP 
projects. But the government does not—and should not—provide guarantees for projects run 
under state-owned enterprises, which are semi-autonomous. Furthermore, the government 
has not fully exploited PPP potential. The preparatory work for bid solicitation and the 
subsequent process management is inefficient. If not addressed, this might result in poor 
response to the solicitation process and ultimately diminish the potential value for money. 
Capacity to spend infrastructure development allocations 
Respondents were unanimous that the Treasury releases monies allocated to various ministries 
on a monthly basis and that no serious bottlenecks are associated with money clearance. But 
the Treasury can release such monies only with parliamentary approval. There have been 
situations when monies that were earmarked for development expenditures and had received 
parliamentary approval were not spent as originally intended and had to be surrendered back 
to the Treasury at fiscal year-end. Respondents attributed that occurrence to the following 
reasons: 
• Procurement procedures are cumbersome. 
• Requisition from ministries is delayed. 
• The authority to spend has not been granted by the Controller of Budget. 
• In many cases, mechanisms for monitoring ministries’ spending are lacking or only 
partly instituted. 
• Funds are mismanaged or misallocated. Because the state auditors only review 
ministries at fiscal year-end, misallocation cannot be unearthed until then. Some 
ministries have in the past directed development budgets to nondevelopment 
purposes. 
• Funding is inadequate. When the Treasury allocates less than the amount needed to 
develop a project, ministries sometimes do not allocate their own money to the project 
in the hope that the Treasury will allocate more money in the next period.  
• Exchequer releases are late. In the event of an emergency (for instance, if hunger is 
declared in a sector of the country), the exchequer might divert part of the 
development budget to attend to the emergency and then submit a request for a 
compensatory allocation later in the year (a practice known as mini budget). This 
causes delays in the release of development monies to affected ministries. In other 
cases, donor countries might have pledged funding for a project, but not signed the 
agreement, often because the government fails to meet funding conditionalities. In 
such cases, budgetary allocations may be made in anticipation, but the exchequer may  
not extend the funds to ministries until the donors actually avail them. 
Overall, respondents contend that the government has the capacity to absorb large amounts 
of money for infrastructure projects, including debt and grants from international financial  
markets. 
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Human resource capacity 
We asked respondents a series of questions to determine whether government departments 
have adequate human resource capacity to handle the infrastructure financing function. Table 
4.2 summarizes the key findings. 
Table 4.2: Human resource capacity responses—Kenya 
 Dominant 
response 
Proportion and 
percentage of 
respondents 
1. Does the government have adequate staffing to handle infrastructure 
matters of each line ministry? 
NO 4/6 
 
0.67 
2. Is the internal staff well-trained in technical disciplines, such as policy, 
economics, and finance? 
YES 5/6 0.83 
3. Is the internal staff conversant with the various markets for infrastructure 
financing? 
YES 6/6 1.00 
4. Internal staff capabilities 
i) Are they able to forecast and use interest rates across 
international markets and to perform a clear and informed 
comparison of available infrastructure financing? 
YES 4/6 0.67 
ii) Does the internal staff have the ability to independently and 
conclusively conduct a feasibility study? 
NO 4/6 0.67 
iii) Can they satisfactorily conduct a baseline study for envisaged 
infrastructure development? 
NO 5/6 0.83 
iv) Do they have the ability to perform cash flow forecasts for projects 
in their jurisdiction under various macroeconomic scenarios? 
NO 4/6 0.67 
v) Arising from the previous question (iv), does the staff, therefore, have 
the capacity to conduct a bankable study, complete with estimates of 
cash flows, for investors’ consideration? 
NO 5/6 0.83 
vi) Are they able to simulate financial bids and come up with cash bid 
estimates that reasonably represent actual bids? 
NO 6/6 1.00 
vii) Does staff have the capacity to process payments, analyze 
performance measures, and develop reports and trends? 
YES 6/6 1.00 
Table 4.2 shows that, in their present state, the staff employed in the key ministries that deal 
with infrastructure financing do not have adequate competencies to perform a bankable study, 
which feeds into the entire project process. All respondents believe that ministry staff cannot 
effectively simulate bids and develop reasonable estimates to guide the bid solicitation 
process. By providing the project specifications, proper background studies inform the 
government’s tender advertisements, tender evaluation and award, value -for-money 
computations, and risk sharing (in PPPs), as well as establish guarantee requirements and 
unitary fees. Such human resource inadequacies, therefore, have serious implications for 
infrastructure financing and, according to some respondents, often have caused delays and 
cancellations of bid awards, with the usual attendant costly legal corollaries. 
Respondents suggested one solution to the skill inadequacy problem: training, training, 
training! Training can be achieved through apprenticeships under the technical staff currently 
hired from abroad; secondments of staff to organizations that ordinarily deal with 
infrastructure issues, such as development banks; provision of regular in -service workshops; 
collaborations with training institutions, such as universities; and short courses, typically 
supported by quasi-public organizations, such as Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
and African Development Bank (AfDB). 
To establish whether capacity issues already addressed are reflected in staff performance, 
regular assessments of training needs are recommended. The respondents suggested several 
remedies to address variances between actual performance and expected performance (post -
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training): giving performance appraisals, relieving the employee of his or her duties, and 
redeploying underperforming staff to duties that conform better to their skills and knowledge. 
But no respondents could confirm whether the government had ever applied those 
measures—with the exception of performance appraisal, which has recently gained 
widespread usage in government departments. 
Information and communication technology preparedness 
All respondents agreed that new processes and systems would make working with prospective 
infrastructure financiers easier. Specifically, they suggested the following:  
• The government should embrace e-procurement systems and processes to reduce 
delays and corrupt activities in procurement. 
• The government should introduce e-project management systems to address issues 
about project bankability and project turnaround times. 
• The government should put e-system in place for managing disbursements of project 
cash disbursements. 
• The government should upgrade all ministry and department Internet connections and 
systems to improve speed and enhance data capabilities. 
Respondents also contended that implementing such systems would require additional 
technology training of ministry staff. Such training would not only prepare them to use the 
systems effectively but would also minimize staff resistance to the change. Working 
relationships are not expected to change as a result of the new systems. Currently, employees 
who work directly with or under projects are conversant with project management software 
and terminology, but it is important to promote such knowledge among the other staff as well. 
Respondents believed that government staff are adaptable and open to learning and training.  
To its credit, the government has already started implementing some recommendations. For 
instance, the government recently installed an Integrated Financial Management System in all 
ministries to replace the individual management systems that each ministry previously 
operated. Furthermore, all state-owned enterprises recently were directed to open accounts 
with the Central Bank of Kenya to ease disbursement, monitoring, and evaluation of cash flows. 
Having those accounts will come in handy for such enterprises whenever they have to rely on 
the exchequer for partial or full funding of their projects. Respondents also reported that all 
government departments involved in infrastructure financing have in-house computer 
hardware and software expertise to manage system problems, crashes, and other 
emergencies. 
Mauritius 
Data for Mauritius were gathered from nine respondents of whom five were from the public 
sector. We present, below, the key matters arising from the responses’ analysis. 
Capital markets and infrastructure financing capacity 
The Stock Exchange of Mauritius, the country’s only organized securities exchange, trades in 
several financial instrument classes, including equity, corporate bonds, Treasury bonds, and 
exchange-traded funds (see table 4.3). Respondents suggested that the total volume of 
transactions of all asset classes listed was too small to create separate platforms for each asset 
class. The market is equipped with adequate infrastructure, including ICT infrastructure, which 
supports the trading of all securities in one platform. A secondary capital market for bonds, an 
avenue that would promote the issuance of corporate bonds, is almost nonexistent; however, 
the financial sector is replete with liquidity and a strong appetite for debt instrument. Yet not 
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many issued debt instruments are floated in the market, especially by corporate issuers. The 
government, on the other hand, has issued several bonds of various maturities in the market—
however, not enough to satisfy investors’ appetite. Because of the inadequate supply o f 
securities and thin trading, the market’s debt segment is not as liquid as the equity segment.  
The government is trying to address the problem of debt market thinness. In the 2014 financial 
policy statement, the Financial Services Commission of Mauritius  was mandated to help 
develop the bond market by considering licensing commercial banks as primary market dealers, 
which would then act as market makers. Similarly, the government introduced the trading of 
Treasury bills on the exchange in December 2003, as the first step in a process aimed at 
establishing an active secondary market for government securities. The stock market has been 
working closely with the Central Bank of Mauritius and commercial banks to set up a platform 
for the trade of medium- and long-term government securities on the exchange. Also, 
transaction fees at the exchange were recently reduced to encourage trading.  
Table 4.3: Capital market capacity responses—Mauritius 
 Dominant 
Response 
Proportion and 
percentage of 
respondents 
1. Is there a well-developed public capital market in the country that can 
enable the government (central and local) to issue debt securities to 
finance infrastructure needs? 
YES 
 
5/9 
 
0.56 
2. Has the public debt market for federal/national, state or county, and 
municipal debt issues been formalized in the country?  
YES 9/9 
 
1.00 
3. Has the formalized public debt market been extended to issuances by 
private issuers (companies and institutions)?  
YES 8/9 0.89 
4. Are issuances of debt by public and private entities considered 
important asset classes for investment purposes by investors in the 
country?  
YES 6/9 
 
0.67 
5. Is the debt market trading in the same platform as the national stock 
exchange?  
YES 9/9 1.00 
6. Is the exchange modern and feted with sufficient ICT infrastructure? YES 7/9 0.78 
A regulation has also been recently enacted to allow the government to raise money directly 
to finance infrastructure activities.23 But the government has not formally gone to the capital 
market to seek funds in this manner; respondents gave several reasons to explain why. First, 
the government has imposed a statutory total debt ceiling of 50 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). The debt-to-GDP ratio currently stands at about 54 percent, which slightly 
exceeds that ceiling. The government would not like to increase that debt, violating the self -
imposed ceiling and possibly becoming unsustainable. Second, sourcing debt from internal 
markets might have an adverse impact on capital availability to the private sector, which might 
compromise the achievement of economic growth targets. Third, alternative funding sources, 
such as the World Bank and African Development Bank, provide adequate finance. 
Respondents claimed that a good relationship with external debt financiers is important 
                                                          
23 The Asset-backed Securities Regulations have been issued under the Capital Markets Act (Cap 485A) to guide 
the issuance of infrastructure and other asset-backed debt at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. See 
file:///C:/Users/a0035636/Downloads/Capital%20Markets%20Assets%20Baked%20Securities%20Regulations%20
2007.pdf (accessed July 16, 2015). 
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because they sometimes renegotiate loan terms should the country encounter cash flow 
constraints during the loan tenure. 
Capacity to finance infrastructure through PPPs 
The Mauritian economy is developing on free enterprise principles, in which the private sector 
plays a vital role. The private sector is vibrant and sizable relative to GDP and has cross -border 
operations and connections. Thus, respondents explain, the government has implemented 
several measures support private enterprise, including a low tax environment and tax 
subsidies; an environment that makes doing business easy; policy reforms and regular dialogue 
with business to reduce bottlenecks; business facilitation through the removal or consolidation 
of licensing requirements; and introduction of e-payments to ease business setups. 
Respondents explain that government has partnered with the private sector in the past to 
realize the country’s infrastructure financing objectives in various sectors, including power 
supply (through well-negotiated long-term contracts with many independent power 
producers, which will expire around 2016 and might have to be renegotiated); long-term leases 
of land, which enables long-range planning of production and realization of return on 
investment; and solid and liquid waste management. But the partnerships in place were mostly 
arranged several years ago, and they neither fit the current definition of public –private 
partnerships (PPPs) nor are they arranged within the ambit of the current PPP framework. The 
government recently established a PPP Unit—as a Ministry of Finance department—which 
works closely with line ministries that are directly involved in public infrastructure projects, 
such as the Ministry of Transport. Ministry support teams have also been established in each 
line ministry to coordinate with the PPP Unit.  
Within this PPP framework, the government has not been able to partner with the private 
sector on any project. According to respondents, two infrastructure projects were recently 
mooted for PPP financing: a comprehensive road infrastructure project and a light rail 
transport (LRT) system. In both cases, the PPP unit worked with the Ministry of Transport , 
which appointed a local project manager, and an external consultant who is well conversant 
with PPPs and LRT systems. The government was looking to raise about MUR 15 billion 
(approximately USD 417 million) for the LRT project and MUR 30 billion (USD 834 million) for 
the road project. According to respondents, local institutional investors were reluctant to 
participate in the project because of their high levels of risk aversion. They nonetheless 
expressed willingness to “get on board when the projects get rolling.” Although foreign banks, 
such as Barclays and HSBC, were enthusiastic about the proposals, neither project could muster 
sufficient investor appetite, and both were shelved. 
Therefore, the Mauritian government has not, in the context of the current PPP framework, 
used the private sector to realize the country’s infrastructure development objectives. 
Furthermore, the country has no PPP projects in the pipeline. Respondents attribute this to 
several factors. First, the PPP Unit and line ministries lack project management expertise and 
advisors who can proper price projects. Second, the expertise deficit and inadequate public 
awareness have created a public perception that the PPP approach benefits the private sector 
more than it does the intended beneficiaries; this has led to the public’s resistance. Third, 
although current legislation can help operate PPPs, no specific legislation is dedicated solely to 
PPPs and that defines PPP parameters and parties’ duties, rights, and obligations. Because of 
this, the private sector perceives risk with PPP projects. Fourth, the lack of political support 
could be blamed for the envisaged LRT and road projects failing to take off. As respondents 
explained, the new political leadership, having ridden to power on the promise to improve the 
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efficiency of water provision (which sees about 50 percent of water lost in the supply chain), 
was not supportive of the LRT and road projects. 
Capacity to spend infrastructure development allocations 
For development and infrastructure allocations, every ministry has finance staff who undertake 
due diligence at the project budgeting phase. Ministry of Finance officers are posted to the line 
ministries specifically to advise on the project process. After their input and authorization,  a 
funding proposal for the particular project is prepared and forwarded to Ministry of Finance 
(which hosts the National Treasury) for approval. Approval often is sought at the start of the 
financial year through the national financial budgeting process. The Treasury then confirms, 
among other details, that the engineer’s certificate (where relevant) is attached. If approved, 
the Treasury allocates funds for the project and forwards the proposal—together with others 
from other ministries—to parliament. If parliament grants approval, cash is disbursed to the 
relevant ministry. Preparing the budget document and receiving parliament approval takes 
approximately three to four months. 
The transfer of funds takes about one week from the point of its requisition,  depending on 
whether all supporting documents (such as invoices countersigned by the Minister) have been 
submitted with the requisition. Any monies not spent in the allocated fiscal year are returned 
to the Treasury at fiscal year-end. But ministries can apply to the Treasury to reuse, in the next 
fiscal year, unused funds returned the previous year. Such applications typically are granted, 
with minimal requirements for justification. A change in the law is envisaged to allow up to 5 
percent of lapsed funds to automatically carry over into the next fiscal year.  
Line ministries spend 80–85 percent of their allocations each year, and a lot is re-allocated. For 
example, say the Treasury approved project A (building a new road in location “a”) for funding 
in a given financial year. If project B (road rehabilitation after heavy rains in location “b”), which 
was not approved, becomes, in the ministry’s estimation, more urgent during the fiscal year, 
the ministry can apply for Treasury approval to spend the monies allocated to project A on the 
new, urgent project B. The Treasury often approves such applications. Thus, the 80–85 percent 
spending may sometimes account for two projects rather than one. 
Reasons for underspending 
Ministries may underspend development allocations for several reasons. 
• Contract award often delays beyond the beginning of a fiscal year; hence, work begins 
much later. Because spending is prorated on the actual work done, monies attributed 
to work not yet done will be reflected as unspent in the ministry’s records. 
• The procurement procedure is lengthy and may delay further if bidders are not 
responsive and the tender exercise must start over. Among other reasons, 
respondents ascribe such delays to technical capacity shortages in line ministries to 
prepare project specifications and manage the process. 
• Project takeoff—hence spending—often has been delayed by the Public Infrastructure 
Division and the Central Procurement Board, which are in charge of technical aspects, 
such as project design preparation (after the line ministry prepares project 
specifications), preparation of tender documents and bid evaluation, and project 
launch. 
• Line ministries cannot supervise large numbers of public works; hence, project 
implementation typically is staggered across time. 
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• Mauritius is a small economy with few contractors who can be awarded large tenders; 
similarly, the skilled labor market is limited. These labor market deficiencies slow down 
project implementation.  
Dealing with bottlenecks in infrastructure allocations spending 
Respondents suggested several solutions to the lack of full spending on infrastructure project 
allocations. 
• Human resource capacity should be built in line ministries to deal with project planning, 
preparation, and management and in the Central Procurement Board to ensure timely 
evaluation of bids. Where possible, the national budget should provide funds to hire 
project finance and project management experts in line ministries, on short contracts, 
to assist with project preparation and implementation. 
• The government should consider creating a centralized agency to handle all project 
management duties, rather than duplicate those roles at the various line ministries.  
• Human resource capacity in risk analysis and contingency planning must be built. 
Frequently, scope adjustment and project component changes become necessary once 
the project has started; this is indicative of poor planning. But need exists to have 
specialists in line ministries (or in the proposed centralized agency) who can take 
corrective action, for instance, when project time and cost overruns appear imminent.  
• Although capacity constraints can largely be explained by lack of specialized training 
of staff in government service, it can also be explained by the country’s lack of 
experience with private sector involvement in public infrastructure provision. Thus, 
training is necessary to enhance government employees’ skills in deal structuring and 
project financing. Such training would be more effective if done through actual PPP 
transactions rather than in a classroom. 
• Procurement procedures should be simplified to foster transparency, fairness, and 
accountability. 
Human resource capacity 
Table 4.4 summarizes respondents’ views on the state of ministerial human resource 
preparedness to deal with private sector involvement in infrastructure financing in Mauritius. 
The table reveals an urgent need to undertake human resource capacity enhancement within 
the government if the private sector is to be successfully engaged. Respondents agre e that 
public infrastructure financing expertise is deficient in the country and that the country should 
make a deliberate effort to provide or sponsor relevant training. But most respondents opine 
that staff development is not necessary for each line ministry lest the country end up with an 
expensive overcapacity relative to its small size. Thus, the Public Infrastructure Ministry should 
be provided with the desired staffing capacity so that it can provide advisory services to the 
line ministries. 
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Table 4.4: Human resource capacity responses—Mauritius 
 Dominant 
response 
Proportion and 
percentage of 
respondents 
1. Does the government have adequate staffing to handle infrastructure 
matters of each line ministry? 
NO 5/5 
 
1.00 
2. Is the internal staff well trained in technical disciplines, such as policy, 
economics, and finance? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
3. Is the internal staff conversant with the various markets for infrastructure 
financing? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
4. Internal staff capabilities 
i) Are they able to forecast and use interest rates across international 
markets and to perform a clear and informed comparison of available 
infrastructure financing? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
ii) Does the internal staff have the ability to independently and 
conclusively conduct a feasibility study? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
iii) Can they satisfactorily conduct a baseline study for envisaged 
infrastructure development? 
NO 4/5 0.80 
iv) Do they have the ability to perform cash flow forecasts for projects in 
their jurisdiction within various macroeconomic scenarios? 
NO 4/5 0.80 
v) Arising from the previous question (iv), do they therefore have the 
capacity to conduct a bankable study, complete with estimates of cash 
flows, for investors’ consideration? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
vi) Are they able to simulate financial bids and come up with cash bid 
estimates that reasonably represent actual bids? 
NO 5/5 1.00 
vii) Does staff have the capacity to process payments, analyze 
performance measures, and develop reports and trends? 
YES 3/5 0.60 
Information and communication technology preparedness 
Processes that govern infrastructure financing are clearly stated and are covered in various 
regulations and laws. For instance, the PPP process is defined to include a feasibility study, a 
market study, obtainment of approval at every stage from the PPP committee, and use of an 
open tender system. Those components, however, exist only on paper, as no modern IT system 
is linked to that process. Thus, developing and implementing new processes to service various 
infrastructure financing functions is clearly needed. 
To the country’s credit, the government recently started automating the budget process, with 
phase one currently under way. The entire process of budget automation could be done in one 
or two years. The automation process is led by the Mauritian State Informatics Limited and is 
being done in partnership with external firms, such as Oracle (the budget system will run on 
Oracle). The capital budgeting process and project management systems are being automated 
through a similar partnership with external parties. The ministries are, however, still using the 
conventional, paper-based framework in their budgeting process. 
A computerized system (IT platform) is also being developed for procurement. That system 
should make preparing requisitions and receiving quotations from all suppliers easier and 
quicker. But a change in law, or enactment of new legislation, might be necessary to effect the 
new IT procurement platform. 
South Africa 
Except for two respondents who were willing to grant us an interview and complete the 
questionnaires by hand, every potential respondent in South Africa asked us to email questions 
to them. As of the time of compiling this report, several of those respondents had not yet 
returned their questionnaires. Thus, we have made our report from only 11 returned 
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questionnaires (4 from the public sector) and 2 interviews in the private sector —a total of 13 
respondents.  
Capital markets and infrastructure financing capacity 
Addition to the answers in table 4.5, respondents stated that the Public Financial Management 
Act (PFMA) and the Municipal Finance Act (MFA) deal with the issues in questions 2 and 3. But 
many municipalities do not have the asset base or financial resources required to support heavy 
debt repayment and, as such, find financing their infrastructure needs difficult.  
Table 4.5: Capital market capacity responses—South Africa 
 Dominant 
Response 
Proportion of 
respondents 
1. Is there a well-developed public capital market in the country that can 
enable the government (central and local) to issue debt securities to 
finance infrastructure needs? 
YES 
 
11/13 
 
0.84 
2. Has the public debt market for federal/national, state or county, and 
municipal debt issues been formalized in the country?  
YES 13/13 
 
1.00 
3. Has the formalized public debt market been extended to issuances by 
private issuers (companies and institutions)?  
YES 13/13 1.00 
4. Are issuances of debt by public and private entities considered 
important asset classes for investment purposes by investors in the 
country?  
YES 13/13 
 
1.00 
5. Is the debt market trading in the same platform as the national stock 
exchange?  
YES 10/13 0.78 
6. Is the exchange modern and feted with sufficient ICT infrastructure? YES 13/13 1.00 
Respondents were asked to explain whether using one platform (exchange) for the trade of 
equity and debt securities presented challenges to the exchange or to traders. Respondents 
clarified that although the trading of several security classes is housed at  the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange (JSE), trading mechanics and platforms differ for individual securities. For 
debt securities, for instance, the JSE Debt Board, the platform through which both Treasury 
and corporate bonds are listed, was established recently following the acquisition and 
upgrading of the Bond Exchange of South Africa by the JSE. The specialized mechanics of trade 
at the board encourages bond trading efficiency and is managed independently of the equity 
trading platform; hence, it does not present any challenges.  
Respondents also stated that local debt markets have been extensively used by government 
agencies to source for infrastructure funding. Furthermore, the dealers appointed to make a 
market for government bonds (including the bond issues of parastatals) interact at length with 
local banks and investment companies. There are a few setbacks, though. First is the legal 
framework: the PFMA does not include debt as a potential financing method; the MFA, on the 
other hand, allows debt financing, but many municipalities do not qualify for repayment plans 
implied by the magnitude of funding that they are likely to seek. Second, the use of project 
bonds as a financing mechanism may be unattractive to investors with a lower tolerance for 
risk, which is inherently high in the construction industry. Institutional bond investors, although 
happy to take on performance risk, generally are not prepared to take on any form of 
construction risk. Third, beyond 10 years, the Treasury bond yield curve is not so accurate and 
stable that it can be used as a pricing benchmark for infrastructure bond issues. This has two 
effects: potential bond investors are likely to require a higher return than is probably justified 
by the risk inherent in infrastructure bond issues to compensate for pricing uncertainty; and it 
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distorts forecasts for the effective demand for that class of bonds and, hence, discourages the 
public sector from issuing them. 
Respondents said that, for several reasons, those financing avenues have not been fully 
explored. First, South Africa’s private sector alone is not large enough to help cover the 
existing infrastructure funding gap at the rates of return typically earned on infrastructure 
investments. Private sector involvement is limited those entities whose return requirements 
are not high because of their restricted risk appetite. Those entities typically include large-scale 
investors, such as pension funds and state-owned investment companies, which are formed 
solely to drive economic development. Second, there is a lack of proper government policy and 
of expertise in structuring financing deals. Third, potential (foreign) bond investors perceive 
the country as an unattractive investment destination because of skills shortage, unreliable and 
expensive energy, and relatively high political risks. 
Alternatives to capital-markets-based financing 
The South African central government largely invests in infrastructure through the state -
owned companies, which raise funds in a variety of ways, including budget allocations, bond 
financing, and long-term PPPs. The provincial governments have their own retail bond issues, 
along with their budget allocations from the national Treasury and other bespoke financing 
mechanisms. Further options being considered include corporate social investment trust, 
foreign grants, equity in the form of land, long-term lease of land, and private equity. The more 
mundane approaches include negotiating loans with development banks, such as AfDB, 
NEPAD, and Islamic Development Bank; supranational institutions, such as the World Bank; 
commercial banks; and quasi-public organizations, such as the European Union and the United 
States Agency for International Development. 
Another alternative is public–private partnerships (PPPs), which are gaining preference by the 
public sector. But this option has its shortcomings: First, the private sector has little appetite 
for PPPs because of process delays and investors’ low risk tolerance. Second, there are 
perceptions that government gets “ripped-off by the private sector” through PPPs; 
perceptions of lack of transparency and observance of public interest in the award of PPP 
tenders; and lack of good track records with previous PPP projects.  
Again, the available alternative infrastructure financing sources have not been optimally used 
by the government for several reasons—among them, budget misallocations, restrictions 
imposed by PFMA and MFA, and private sector low risk tolerance. Furthermore, the 
institutional capacity among municipalities is too low to enable them take advantage of 
emerging funding sources. 
Capacity to finance infrastructure through PPPs 
All respondents believe that the private sector in South Africa is an important contributor to 
the country’s GDP. The government provides support to the private sector in several ways, 
including tax subsidies for investors who invest in certain labor-intensive sectors, such as 
construction and manufacturing; tiered pricing of energy; and a “friendly” corporation tax 
policy that implicitly subsidizes trade and manufacturing. Furthermore, the government has set 
up the Export Credit Insurance Company to support South African companies expanding into 
markets across the border; established a grants initiative through the Department of Trade and 
Industry to aid research and product development of companies in certain pre-identified core 
sectors of the economy; and created the Coega Industrial Development Zone, an initiative that 
targets high-impact industry with various incentives. 
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South Africa’s private sector is sizable, vibrant, and connected to cross-border business 
partners. Although bank financing is still more popular as a source of financing among South 
African corporates, the private sector employs a great deal of non-bank financing. The public 
debt market in South Africa is still dominated by Treasury bonds; at the end of 2013, the JSE 
had roughly 1,600 listed debt instruments, totaling more than ZAR 1.8 trillion (about USD 145 
billion) outstanding in nominal terms, more than half of them placed by the South African 
government.24 The private sector—particularly insurance firms and pension funds, which are 
unable to obtain assets of a maturity long enough to match the duration of their liabilities 
elsewhere in the capital market—is believed to have strong appetite for PPP projects. 
The government has, therefore, drawn from private sector expertise in recent years to help 
provide public infrastructure. Examples abound: various public health projects (such as Albert 
Luthuli Hospital in Durban and Fairview Hospital in Free State); and several projects in the 
transport sector (such as Gautrain, all national road concessions run by South African National 
Roads Agency [SANRAL]) and in the energy sector (such as independent power producer 
programs and renewable energy projects). The government has also partnered as an equity 
provider in the subsidized housing project and guaranteed debt in the purchase of 
manufacturing equipment in Coega factories in Port Elizabeth. 25 
Barriers to effective use of the PPP strategy 
Although a lot has been achieved through public–private partnerships, respondents opine that 
the public sector has not optimally used the private sector to realize the country’s 
infrastructure needs. Specifically, respondents identify the following key challenges: 
• Municipalities that would benefit from PPPs have not clearly understood the process 
and are run by people without the requisite knowledge to implement it.  
• The public sector is not enthusiastic about PPPs for several reasons: the elaborate roll-
out procedure required; the less-than-impressive track record with PPP projects; and 
inefficiencies in delivering infrastructure projects, such as cost and time overruns.  
• Treasury Regulation 16, the framework that governs the PPP process, is considered too 
complex and deemed by the private sector as seeking to regulate rather than promote 
PPPs. 
• Although a clear PPP framework exists, there is no political will or commitment to 
extend the PPP program. Thus, although private sector has an appetite for  PPPs, there 
is a shortage of project pipeline from which the private sector may choose.  
• The public sector and South African citizens distrust the PPP process because they 
perceive that PPPs’ benefits are tilted heavily in the private sector’s favor and th at the 
award of PPP tenders is corrupt. 
• Inadequate knowledge and expertise exist about how best to structure financing deals 
within both the public and the private sector. 
• PPPs require a high level of due diligence, which can be time consuming and costly. In 
that sense, such projects also attract relatively high required rates of return to 
compensate for any possible risk factors not foreseeable during due diligence.  
Capacity to spend infrastructure development allocations 
According to respondents, the Treasury timely releases funds allocated to development 
activities. But instances have occurred when allocated project monies were not spent by the 
concerned state departments and municipalities and were ceded to the Treasury at fiscal year -
                                                          
24 https://www.jse.co.za/trade/debt-market (accessed April 17, 2015). 
25 The housing project has been dubbed the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) housing scheme. 
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end. Respondents ascribed this to the lack of technical expertise in the smaller municipalities 
to use their Municipal Infrastructure Grant allocations; and to the bureaucracy that causes 
delays in decision making and, hence, delays in money use. 
To address those challenges, the government has relied on consultants, who are often 
deployed to lend their technical expertise to municipalities and other departments to 
accelerate Municipal Infrastructure Grant expenditure absorption. Furthermore, the 
government, in conjunction with universities and other training institutions, has been running 
in-service courses that target municipal officials who are directly involved in project and 
infrastructure management. 
Human resource capacity 
Table 4.6 shows some deficiencies in staff competencies, which may inhibit efficient operations 
of the infrastructure function. For instance, available staff cannot simulate investors’ financial 
bids, which is necessary in private investor bid evaluation and, if not handled well, may cause 
delays and indecisiveness in the award of contracts. But some respondents also proposed that 
the private sector should perform some of those tasks. For instance, respondents suggested 
that private sector entities participating in a PPP bid should produce a set of fundi ng and 
financing options that the relevant government departments should assess.  
Table 4.6: Human resource capacity responses—South Africa 
 Dominant 
response 
Proportion of 
respondents 
1. Does the government have adequate staffing to handle infrastructure 
matters of each line ministry? 
NO 4/4 
 
1.00 
2. Is the internal staff well trained in technical disciplines, such as policy, 
economics, and finance? 
YES 4/4 1.00 
3. Is the internal staff conversant with the various markets for infrastructure 
financing? 
YES 4/4 1.00 
4. Internal staff capabilities 
i) Are they able to forecast and use interest rates across international 
markets and to perform a clear and informed comparison of available 
infrastructure financing? 
NO 3/4 0.75 
ii) Does the internal staff have the ability to independently and 
conclusively conduct a feasibility study? 
YES 4/4 1.00 
iii) Can they satisfactorily conduct a baseline study for envisaged 
infrastructure development? 
YES 4/4 1.00 
iv) Do they have the ability to perform cash flow forecasts for projects in 
their jurisdiction within various macroeconomic scenarios? 
YES 3/4 0.75 
v) Arising from the preceding question (iv), do they therefore have the 
capacity to conduct a bankable study, complete with estimates of cash 
flows, for investors’ consideration? 
YES 2/4 0.50 
vi) Are they able to simulate financial bids and come up with cash bid 
estimates that reasonably represent actual bids? 
NO 3/4 0.75 
vii) Does staff have the capacity to process payments, analyze 
performance measures, and develop reports and trends? 
YES 4/4 1.00 
Notwithstanding suggestions of that nature, the government has instituted several procedures 
to address staff deficiencies. First, the government is making every effort to employ 
professional staff in relevant departments, such as its Infrastructure and Economics Unit of the 
Treasury, who can technically analyze and engage meaningfully with the private sector parties 
that want to get involved in the various forms of infrastructure financing. Second, the 
government is encouraging foreign entities that have expressed interest in infrastructure 
tenders to partner with local private sector investors, at the bidding stage, to qualify for the 
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award of tenders for large-scale infrastructure projects. That enables skills transfer, which 
allows the country to build capacity and skills to aid infrastructure development in the future 
through local expertise. The government hopes that such a policy would make sourcing private 
sector expertise cheaper and quicker in the future and enable the government to expedite the 
initial tender award process. Further, the government has teamed up with universities and 
other higher learning institutions to provide skills enhancement as a component of corporate 
social investment. 
To ensure that these capacity enhancement initiatives are reflected in performance, staff 
performance monitoring and management strategies have been put in place. For example, the 
senior management staff of each state department are required to sign a performance contract 
with top management, which is evaluated for target achievement at the end of each quarter. 
Information and communication technology preparedness 
New processes are needed to make working with prospective infrastructure financiers easy, 
according to respondents. Such new processes include a simplified supply chain management 
system that can mitigate corrupt practices within the government and in the private sector; a 
simplified PPP Treasury Regulation 16 to speed up the process and delivery; an IT platform for 
handling tendering and management of private sector involvement; and a repository of 
bankable infrastructure projects that are readiness graded on an electronic platform accessible 
to national and international financiers. The respondents believe that additional IT capability 
would improve the infrastructure function’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
The staff in the ministries involved in infrastructure development is, however, conversant with 
the public–private partnership and process and project management techniques and software, 
according to the respondents. To ensure that capability, appropriate qualification and 
experience are required at the time of recruitment, including being registered with 
professional bodies in their line of expertise. This recruitment process has ensured that skille d 
IT personnel exist in government departments to develop the new systems and platforms. In 
the unlikely event that such skill is insufficient, specialists in universities and other public 
institutions may be called upon to assist. But because the ministries have, in some cases, not 
yet installed specific project management software, it is unclear whether personnel in those 
ministries have the knowledge to manage and run the financing aspects of infrastructure 
development (such as using software to aid in forecasting cash flows and computing internal 
rates of return). Respondents clarified that such specialized functions can always be 
outsourced, as internal capacity is built.  
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CHAPTER 5. A FRAMEWORK FOR CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT TO 
SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
Chapter 4 outlined several capacity constraints suffered by three prominent capital markets in 
Africa in terms of infrastructure financing. The three markets differ on infrastructure financing 
barriers and on the measures that those countries have instituted to deal with those barriers. 
Drawing from lessons from the three countries, this chapter offers a four-prong framework for 
infrastructure financing capacity building for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Capacity enhancement strategy #1: Incentivize public debt markets development 
Chapter 4’s analysis suggests that effective infrastructure financing is closely intertwined with 
the development of a country’s capital markets, especially the long -term debt market. 
Governments that want to locally finance their infrastructure projects should help develop the 
local capital markets. 
Consider a government with no debt ceilings. The government can raise an unlimited amount 
of long-term debt to finance infrastructure projects from the domestic capital market. In any 
given period, t, assuming no outstanding infrastructure bond issues, assuming that bond issues 
are fully backed by government credit and are therefore riskless, and assuming no floatation 
costs, the initial required cost of financing is the investors’ real required rate of return plus 
expected inflation, r. Because human capital (knowledge, skills, experience of project staff 
such as engineers) is inelastic in the short run, additional projects in a given period exert 
pressure on human resource capacity, reduce the efficiency with which they are managed and, 
potentially, reduce the return on invested capital. Thus, the marginal cost of public 
infrastructure financing increases with additional new bond issues, beyond some hypothetical 
breaking point, to reflect additional project risk. The new required cost of financing is thus:  
r^d=r+ξ            (4) 
where ξ is the additional premium arising from increased project risk (overstretched human 
resource capacity). But the cost of infrastructure financing from the domestic markets, in 
equation (4), is still lower than the cost of financing by issuing a bond in foreign markets.26 That 
is because foreign bondholders will price several risk factors, including sovereign risk (from 
foreign investors’ point of view, sovereign risk represents default risk, which increases with 
declines in a country’s sovereign credit rating as more debt is used to support infrastructure 
projects) and foreign exchange risk,27 which increases the cost of infrastructure financing to 
r^f=r^d+γ_fx β_fx+γ_sv β_sv          (5) 
where γ_fx and γ_sv are, respectively, foreign exchange risk and sovereign risk premia, and 
β_fx and β_sv are, respectively, the magnitudes of foreign exchange and sovereign risks borne. 
This simple analysis shows that issuing infrastructure bonds in the domestic capital market is 
more advantageous for the government than issuing them in the foreign markets. Because 
findings suggest that huge appetite exists for additional debt issues in all the security markets 
studied, African governments can effortlessly tap into their local debt markets for 
                                                          
26 For instance, the use of Eurobonds to finance infrastructure projects has been popular with several countries in 
Africa (such as Ghana and Kenya), which have used them multiple times in recent years. 
27 Currency risk is not expected for Eurobonds, which are denominated in foreign currency, but should be positive 
for foreign bonds. 
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CHAPITRE 5. CADRE POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES EN 
APPUI AU FINANCEMENT DES INFRASTRUCTURES EN AFRIQUE 
SUBSAHARIENNE 
 
Le chapitre 4 décrit plusieurs contraintes en matière de de capacité auxquelles trois marchés 
importants de capitaux en Afrique font face en termes de financement des infrastructures. Les 
trois marchés diffèrent sur les obstacles au financement des infrastructures et sur les mesures 
ntreprises pour faire face à ces contraintes. En tirant les leçons des trois pays, ce chapitre 
propose un cadre en quatre volets pour le renforcement des capacités en matière de 
financement des infrastructures pour l'Afrique subsaharienne. 
 
Stratégie de renforcement des capacités No. 1 : Favoriser le développement des marchés de la 
dette publique 
L'analyse du Chapitre 4 montre que l'efficacité du financement des infrastructures est 
étroitement liée au développement des marchés de capitaux d'un pays, en particulier le marché 
de la dette à long terme. Les gouvernements qui souhaitent financer leurs projets 
d'infrastructures localement devraient donc favoriser le développement des marchés de 
capitaux locaux. 
 
Supposons un g uvernement s ns plafond d'endettement. Un gouvernement par il peut mobiliser 
une quantité il imitée de dette à long terme à travers le marché intérieur des capitaux afin de financer 
des projets d'infrastructure. Au cours d'une période donnée t, supposons les hypothèses suivantes : 
l'absence d'émissions d’obligations en en circulation, les émissions d'obligations sont entièrement 
garantis par le gouvernement et donc sans risque, et l'absence de coûts de d’émission des actions. Le 
coût de financement initial requis est le taux de rendement réel des investissements plus l'inflation 
prévue, r. Eatnt donné que le capital humain (connaissances, compétences, expérience du personnel 
travaillant sur le projet tels les ingénieurs) est inélastique dans l  court terme, l’existence d' utres 
projets au cours d'une période donnée exercent une pression sur la capacité de  re sourc s humaines, 
réduisent l'efficacité avec laquelle elles sont gérées et, par conséquant, réduisent le retour sur 
investissement des capitaux. Ainsi, le coût marginal de financement des infrastructures publiques 
augmente avec les nouvelles émissions d'obligations, au-delà d'un certain point de rupture 
hypothétique, afin de prendre en compte le risque supplémentaire lié au projet. Le nouveau coût de 
financement requis est ainsi : 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟 + 𝜉𝜉        (4) 
 
où ξ est la prim  supplémentaire découlant du risque accru associé au projet (surexploitation de 
la capacité des ressources humaines). Il faut cependant noter que le coût de financement des 
infrastructures des marchés intérieurs (dans l'équation (4)) est encore inférieur au coût de 
financement par l'émission d'obligations sur les marchés étrangers.26 La raison est que les 
détenteurs de titres étrangers établiront les prix de plusieurs facteurs de risque, y compris le 
risque souverain (du point de vue des investisseurs étrangers, le risque souverain représente le 
risque de non-paiement, qui augmente avec la diminution de la notation du crédit souverain du 
pays dans la mesure où plus de dette est utilisée pour financer les projets d'infrastructure). Un 
autre facteur est le risque de change.27 Le coût du financement des infrastructures est ainsi accru 
tel que décrit dans l’équation suivante : 
                                                          
26 Par exemple, l'utilisation des Eurobonds pour financer les projets d'infrastructure a été très populaire auprès de 
plusieurs pays d'Afrique (comme le Ghana et le Kenya), qui les ont utilisés plusieurs fois au cours des dernières 
années. 
27 Le risque de change n'est pas prévu pour les Eurobonds, qui sont libellés en monnaie étrangère, mais devrait être 
 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 + 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5) 
 
 
où 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  et 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  sont, respectivement, le risque de change et les primes de risque sur la dette souveraine. 
𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓et 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 sont, respectivement, les amplitudes des changes et des risques souverains. Cette analyse 
simple montre qu’il est plus avantageux pour le gouvernement d'émetttr  des obligations pour les 
infrastructures sur le marché des capitaux intérieurs que de le faire sur les marchés étrangers. Les 
résultat  ont montré qu'il existe un a pétit énorme pour l’émission d  dette supplémentaire dans tous 
les marchés des titres étudiés. Les gouvernements africains peuvent ainsi facilement accéder à leurs 
marchés obligataires locaux afin de financer les i frastructures. Il faut ependant noter que l s 
marchés ne sont pas a ssi développés que cela devrait être le cas. Les gouver em ts ont donc la 
responsabilité d'élaborer des stratégies et de fournir des mesures incitatives qui peuvent favoriser le 
développement des marchés intérieurs de la dette publique. Les avantages du développement des 
marchés de la dette publique vont au-delà des besoins du gouvernement à vouloir immédiatement 
fincancer les infrastructures. En effet, les entreprises auront plus d’opportunités de financement à 
moindre coût ce qui permettra  de réduire le coût des capitaux, améliorant ainsi les performances 
économiques des pays. 
 
Titrisation 
Les pays africains ayant des marchés de capitaux assez grands peuvent les approfondir en créant 
ou en stimulant l’émission d'autres titres. Dans certains cas, il y existe une réglementation des 
marchés de capitaux qui régissent l'émission de titres adossés à des actifs. Il faut toutefois noter 
qu’elles sont encore inefficaces ou insuffisantes afin de stimuler la création de tels titres. Les 
organismes de réglementation des marchés de capitaux africains peuvent, de concert avec leurs 
gouvernements, aller au-delà de simplement offrir des possibilités pour la titrisation. Il est alors 
recommandé aux gouvernements d'envisager d'offrir des garanties pour les titres émis par les 
banques sur leurs portefeuilles de financement des infrastructures. 
 
Stratégie de renforcement des capacités No. 2 : Exploiter les ressources du secteur privé 
La première recommandation est fondée sur l'hypothèse simplificatrice selon laquelle les 
gouvernements peuvent émettre des titres de créance et les utiliser pour mobiliser des capitaux 
illimités. Dans la pratique, le niveau élevé d'endettement pourrait ne pas être viable si la 
croissance économique ne correspond pas à la croissance de la dette publique. Par conséquent, 
les pays se sont dans leur majorité imposés des plafonds d'endettement public généralement 
liés implicitement au taux de croissance du PIB. Dans ce contexte, l'utilisation continue des 
marchés de capitaux (ainsi que l'aide publique au développement provenant des gouvernements 
étrangers et les prêts des organismes de financement multilatéraux) pourrait ne pas être 
réalisable en ce sens qu'ils pourraient entrainer un excès de la dette publique par rapport aux 
niveaux soutenables. Il faut par conséquent adopter des sources alternatives de financement 
des infrastructures. 
 
Le mode de financement à travers le partenariat public-privé est reconnu comme une approche 
plus durable. Dans la structure des PPP, un investisseur privé finance le projet d'infrastructure, 
le gouvernement étant un partenaireavec des contributions pouvant comprendre la participation 
au capital. Les flux de trésorerie du projet sont alloués afin de répondre aux obligations du 
financier privé. Cependant, l’aptitude des gouvernements à utiliser des PPP alternatifs est 
également entravée par plusieurs contraintes de capacité. Les gouvernements africains peuvent 
faire face à ces contraintes de plusieurs façons : 
• Établir des unités en charge des PPP avec suffisamment de ressources et de 
compétences, qui sont autonomes ou séparées des trésors nationaux. Cela 
devrait entraîner la simplification des processus de gestion des PPP, tant à l’étape 
                                                          
positif pour les obligations étrangères. 
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infrastructure financing. But the markets are not developed to meaningful levels in this 
manner. Governments therefore have the motivation—and the onus—to formulate policies 
and provide incentives that can spur the development of domestic public debt markets. The 
benefits of local public debt markets development will go beyond governments’ immediate 
infrastructure financing needs. Indeed, firms will have a larger and potentially cheaper pool of 
financing that will lower their cost of capital, thus improving countries’ economic output.  
Securitization  
African countries with fairly large capital markets can deepen them by creating or incentivizing 
the creation of additional securities. In some cases, capital market regulations exist that govern 
the issuance of asset-backed securities, but they are either ineffective or inadequate to 
incentivize the creation of such securities. African capital market regulatory bodies can, in 
liaison with their governments, go beyond just providing an avenue for securitization. We 
recommend that governments consider providing guarantees for securities originated by 
banks from their infrastructure financing portfolios. 
Capacity enhancement strategy #2: Tap into private sector resources  
Our first recommendation is predicated on the simplifying assumption that governments can 
issue debt instruments and use them to raise unlimited amounts of capital. In practice, high 
debt levels might be unsustainable if economic growth does not match the growth  in public 
debt. Therefore, most countries have self-imposed public debt ceilings typically tied implicitly 
to the rate of GDP growth. In this context, continued use of the capital markets (as well as 
official development assistance from foreign governments and loans from multilateral funding 
agencies) might not be feasible because they might cause public debt to exceed sustainable 
levels. Thus, alternative infrastructure financing sources must be embraced.  
A more sustainable approach is the public–private partnership financing mode. In the PPP 
structure, a private investor finances the infrastructure project, with the government 
partnering in various ways, which may include equity participation. Project cash flows are ring -
fenced to satisfy the obligations to the private financier. But governments’ ability to use the 
PPP alternative is also handicapped by several capacity constraints. African governments can 
address such constraints in several ways: 
• Establish well-resourced and technically competent PPP Units that are autonomous or 
delinked from national Treasuries. That should result in streamlined PPP management 
processes, both at the bid solicitation stage and post-award/contract management 
phase. 
• Develop in-house expertise (in project planning and management), as well as 
encourage pooling at the national level of transaction advisors, to provide guidance at 
all stages of the process and to create capacity to engage meaningfully with private 
sector participants. 
• Shift away from the current emphasis of future revenue guarantees for PPP projects 
by the government to being an equity investor. This allows equitable risk sharing, 
which might appeal more to the private sector partners, as well as to end-users of 
infrastructure projects. 
• Educate both the private sector and the public sector about the workings of PPPs. 
Similarly, governments must improve the levels of trust for PPPs by making the process 
transparent. 
• Consider private financing of development and infrastructure through more robust 
and fairer fiscal and tax systems. This is in view of the conflicting findings of several 
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studies on the relationships between fiscal exemptions and tax subsidies granted to 
private sector, government revenue and FDI flows, and given the emerging evidence 
on the role of a stable and transparent business environment in attracting investments 
(see, for example, Halvorsen 1995; Zee, Stotsky, and Ley 2002), as well as the OECD 
(2013) initiative on base erosion and profit shifting. 
Capacity enhancement strategy #3: Build public sector human resource capacity 
To make local capital markets and PPPs work properly, qualified human resources need to drive 
the processes and provide expert advice to the parties involved. In particular, the public sector 
(government) needs in-house expertise to interact with the markets, as well as the private 
sector entities interested in investing in public infrastructure. Infrastructure capacity is lacking 
in various respects in the countries sampled. Specifically, Sub-Saharan governments should 
focus on the following: 
• Training is essential. It can be achieved through short courses; regular in -service 
workshops; collaborations with training institutions, such as universities; 
apprenticeships under the technical staff currently hired from abroad or from th e 
private sector; and seconding of staff to organizations that typically deal with 
infrastructure issues, such as development banks. Conducting regular assessment of 
training needs is also important. 
• Staff development does not have to be provided for each line ministry lest countries 
end up with expensive overcapacity relative to their GDP. Special infrastructure 
ministries or departments could be created, if not yet in existence, or they could be 
better empowered by having the desired staffing capacity to provide advisory services 
to line ministries. 
• To ensure that capacity enhancement initiatives, such as training, are reflected in 
performance, staff performance monitoring and management strategies should exist.  
Capacity enhancement strategy #4: Equip ministries with computerized systems 
The efficiency and effectiveness of human resources can be improved, or at least augmented, 
by adopting modern technology and artificial intelligence systems. Many governments 
recognize the need to provide computerized platforms for their operations and have indeed 
embraced modern information technology. Computerized platforms are required, with 
necessary legislative reforms, to enhance efficiency in procurement and project management. 
In some cases, governments have installed specific financial management software, but it is 
unclear whether personnel in those ministries have adequate knowledge to manage the 
infrastructure’s financing function. The governments can, in the short term, outsource 
qualified personnel to run such systems as they build internal capacity for the long run.  
46 
CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has examined capacity issues for infrastructure development and financing in Sub -
Saharan Africa. It started with a document analysis, in which the state of infrastructure and the 
state of infrastructure financing were collated from several disparate reports and papers. 
Financing needs for Africa’s infrastructure are colossal, and not much has been done recently 
to reduce the funding gap. Energy infrastructure seems to be the most in need, the region 
having produced only about 1.9 percent of the world’s total electricity output. The spending 
need was estimated at about $41 billion annually between 2005 and 2015, which included about 
$14 billion for maintenance and operations. The transport sector comes close behind the energy 
sector in financing need, requiring about $18 billion a year in new investment, half of which is 
for maintenance. The water and sanitation requirement appears to be higher than th at for 
transport, at about $20 billion. But those costs can be lowered through lower -cost 
technologies—such as standposts and boreholes—and reduction of waste to about $11 billion. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is reportedly performing much better in the telecommunic ations sector 
than in any other infrastructure sector, with mobile phone networks, for example, having 
reached up to 80 percent of the population. Yet the region still has the lowest performance 
among the world’s developing regions, with a shortfall in financing estimated at $9 billion per 
year. 
We also investigated the effect of infrastructure development on Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
economic growth by applying principal components analysis on three key variables 
representing telecommunications, power, and transport to developed indices of infrastructure 
stock and infrastructure quality. Using those indices and a set of control variables, we 
estimated an augmented growth model using the System GMM approach. Our results show 
that infrastructure quality explains economic growth, whereas infrastructure stock does not. 
We interpret that result to imply that good infrastructure quality augments productivity and 
output by raising the rate of return on private capital. We recommend that governments not 
only emphasize the provision of infrastructure bulk but provision of infrastructure to the 
standard that can incentivize production by lowering the cost of capital.  
Finally, we did case studies of three Sub-Saharan countries—Kenya, Mauritius, and South 
Africa—chosen based on their levels of capital market development. The purpose was to 
establish the capacity issues that may hamper the sourcing of infrastructure finance for various 
public projects. The survey covered several areas of capacity, including the capital markets , 
human resource, infrastructure spending, and information and communication technology. 
Our findings vary for the three countries, with South Africa coming out as relatively better 
poised to use its capital markets to finance the country’s infrastructure activities, and with 
better qualified and experienced human resources in the ministries that deal with 
infrastructure financing and the national Treasury. But some of South Africa’s regulations 
governing the PPP process were said to be too complex and needed a review. Also, there is 
need to sensitize the public on the PPP process and to disabuse the public’s perception that 
the process is riddled with corrupt procurement practices and that PPPs are beneficial to the 
private partners at the public’s expense. 
 
Kenya is well organized as far as PPPs are concerned, having passed legislation governing the 
process in 2013 and subsequently establishing a separate PPP Unit under the national Treasury. 
The Unit, however, has not successfully closed a PPP project, although several such projects 
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have been initiated; delays in project closing have been attributed to the heavy bureaucratic 
process. The country’s capital markets, although relatively well developed, do not seem ready 
to provide sufficient financing to satisfy public infrastructure needs. For instance, no clear 
policy exists for how the government can use the capital markets for such needs. Similarly, 
Kenya has a shortage of competent transaction advisors who can structure financing in a way 
that meets issuers’ needs, and the few advisors that are available are said to be too expensive. 
Also, public officers need training to interact effectively with private sector financiers, as well 
as to simulate and evaluate tenders. Although the Kenyan government has implemented a 
financial management system, it needs to adopt modern computerized procurement and 
project management systems to make the process more efficient.  
Mauritius perhaps most closely reflects the Sub-Saharan African infrastructure financing 
capacity constraints. The country’s capital market is small, with only 43 listed stocks, only six 
(one foreign) listed corporate bonds, and a market capitalization of about $7 billion at the end 
of 2014. Although the market is equipped with modern communications infr astructure, the 
bond market is thin and has no active secondary market; hence, it cannot support the issuance 
of a “massive” instrument listing to raise infrastructure finance. Furthermore, there are fears 
that sourcing large amounts of infrastructure financing in the local capital market would crowd 
out the private sector and starve it of the sorely needed investment funds.  
Within its PPP framework, Mauritius has not been able to partner with the private sector on 
any project; the two projects that were recently floated under the PPP framework could not 
muster sufficient private sector interest and were consequently shelved. Several infrastructure 
spending bottlenecks have occasionally forced ministries to cede allocated funds to the 
national Treasury at the end of each year; however, such funds can be reallocated to the project 
in the next spending year. Mauritius also seems to be seriously lacking in human resource 
capacity, with ministerial staff said not to possess several critical skills that can enable  the 
smooth functioning of their infrastructure dockets. The country is only now computerizing its 
platforms for capital budgeting, project management, and procurement procedures.  
Given the identified capacity shortcomings for each country, we make several  country-specific 
recommendations that may enable the governments to improve the infrastructure financing 
function. An important capacity constraint identified by respondents is skill shortage in deal 
structuring in all countries in the case study. The following policy recommendations are 
pertinent: 
• African governments should consider joining forces to provide training for the 
development of such skill, which can be employed on a shared basis, to complement 
expensive expertise from outside the continent. 
• Based on our findings regarding infrastructure-growth nexus, governments should 
ensure that the provisioning of public economic infrastructure emphasizes quality if it 
is going to effectively affect the economic growth targets that could propel the region 
into middle-income status. 
• Sub-Saharan countries should build infrastructure financing capacity through a 
deliberate endeavor to create strong and autonomous infrastructure agencies, which 
can repel political interference and make the PPP process more transparent. This will 
enable countries to deal with citizens’ current distrust of private sector involvement in 
infrastructure development. 
These recommendations have several limitations. First, the choice of three infrastructure 
sectors used in the quantitative analysis in chapter 3 was guided by belief in the growth 
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literature that those sectors provide the greatest contribution to economic development. A 
more broad-based index could probably yield better results. In this context, although this paper 
focuses on physical infrastructure, incorporating social infrastructure—especially health and 
education—would make the results broader and more policy informative. Subsequent studies 
should endeavor to fill that need. Second, chapter 4’s three -country survey was designed to 
showcase some of the region’s better performers and draw lessons that can inform the 
region’s policy formulation. A larger sample of countries would enrich our findings. 
Furthermore, although we more or less achieved information saturation in each country, with 
incremental respondents confirming or merely repeating information provided by earlier 
respondents, one might argue that each country’s number of respondents was small and that 
some information might have been left out that could make our case study findings more 
compelling. That is especially true for the more diversified South African economy.   
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES 
Section I: Capital markets and alternative financing sources  
PLEASE TICK ONE OPTION FOR MULTIPLE CHOICE RESPONSE QUESTIONS 
1. Is there a well-developed public capital market in the country that can 
enable the government (central and local) to issue debt securities to 
finance infrastructure needs? 
YES SOME 
ACTIVITY 
NO 
2. Has the public debt market for federal/national, state or county and 
municipal debt issues been formalized in the country?  
YES IN PROCESS NO 
3. Has the formalized public debt market been extended to issuances by 
private issuers (companies and institutions)?  
YES IN PROCESS NO 
4. Are issuances of debt by public and private entities considered important 
asset classes for investment purposes by investors in the country?  
YES NOT 
SURE 
NO 
5. Is the debt market trading in the same platform as the national stock exchange?  YES NO 
If your answer above is YES, what are the challenges arising from this lack of separation, if any?  
6. If debt and stock are traded in the same platform (exchange), is the exchange well 
known and engaged in reasonably regular trading activity? 
YES NO 
7. Is the exchange considered modern and feted with sufficient ICT infrastructure? YES NO 
8. If the answer to Question 7 above is NO, what factors hinder the full use of local debt markets? 
9. How is the government addressing the inadequate use of local debt markets capacity? 
10. How much can the government realize, per issue, from the domestic debt 
markets, including banks? 
ESTIMATE IN USD 
11. If the amount (in your answer to Question 10) is not adequate to fund all of the public sector’s annual 
infrastructure needs, what other sources are available for infrastructure financing? 
12. To what extent has the government used the sources (in Question 11) in the past 
(PERCENTAGE—e.g., 100 percent if the required infrastructure funding)? 
5 years? 10 years? 
13. Have those sources enabled the government to fully bridge the infrastructure 
financing gap? 
YES NO 
14. If the answer to Question 13 is NO, what factors hinder the full use of those alternative sources? 
How is the government addressing those issues/factors? 
Are the methods the government is using to address those issues appropriate, in your view? Why or why 
not? 
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Section II: Public–private partnerships (PPPs) 
1. Is the private sector, in your view, an important/significant contributor to the country’s 
GDP? Why or why not? 
YES NO 
2. Is the private sector seen to be supported by the government (e.g., by way of fair 
taxation, subsidies, collaboration in production and provisioning of a business-enabling 
environment)? 
YES NO 
In which of the above ways (or other) is the government supporting private enterprise, if any? (LIST) 
3. Is the private sector sizable, vibrant, and connected to cross-border business partners? YES NO 
4. Is the private sector known or seen to use substantial non-bank external finance sources 
for its production activities? 
YES NO 
5. Has the government partnered with the private sector to realize the country’s 
infrastructure needs?  
YES NO 
6. Exactly how is the government partnering with the private sector? (PLEASE LIST some 
kinds of PPPs currently in place) 
 
7. Has the public sector (local and central government) optimally used the private sector 
to realize development objectives in the infrastructure financing context?  
YES NO 
8. If the answer to Question 7 is NO, what are the challenges/barriers that have hindered optimal utilization 
of PPPs in the financing and development of infrastructure in this country? (Barriers can include 
legislation, coordinating agencies, procurement policies, project planning, etc.) Please explain your 
responses. 
9. How, in your view, might the barriers/challenges that you have highlighted be addressed? 
10. Does the government have adequate capacity to run several PPP projects at a time?  YES NO 
If YES, how many projects can the government manage at a time? If NO, what are the reasons? 
11. Does the government have the capacity to provide revenue guarantees typically 
required by the private sector financiers before agreeing to finance a project? 
YES NO 
12. If your answer to Question 11 is NO, what factors inform the government’s ability to raise such guarantees?  
What, in your view, is the government doing to address those factors? 
Section III: Spending of infrastructure development allocations  
1. How long does it take, on average, for the Treasury to clear/authorize money for use by 
line ministries and departments?  
 
.… months 
2. What issues are involved in the clearance of money for use from the Treasury by line ministries? (PLEASE 
LIST)  
3. Have there been situations in the recent past when allocated project money was not 
spent and got repossessed by the Treasury or reallocated to the next spending year? 
YES NO 
4. What causes the lack of spending of money allocated for infrastructure development? 
5. How do you intend to deal with those causes of lack of infrastructure spending? 
6. Arising from the issues in Questions 1–5, does the country have the capacity to absorb 
large amounts of money for infrastructure projects, especially in the form of debt or 
grants from international financial markets/sources?  
YES NO 
7. If the answer to Question 6 is NO, what suggestions would you make to help improve the capacity to 
receive and use such funds? 
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Section IV: Human resources 
1. Does the government have adequate staffing to handle infrastructure matters of each line 
ministry? 
YES NO 
2. Is the internal staff well trained in technical disciplines, such as policy, economics, and 
finance? 
YES NO 
3. Is the internal staff conversant with the various markets for infrastructure financing? YES NO 
4. Internal staff capabilities 
i) Are they able to forecast and use interest rates across international markets and to 
perform a clear and informed comparison of available infrastructure financing? 
YES NO 
ii) Does the internal staff have the ability to independently and conclusively conduct a 
feasibility study? 
YES NO 
iii) Can they satisfactorily conduct a baseline study for envisaged infrastructure 
development? 
YES NO 
iv) Do they have the ability to perform cash flow forecasts for projects in their 
jurisdiction under various macroeconomic scenarios? 
YES NO 
v) Arising from Question (iv), do they therefore have the capacity to conduct a bankable 
study, complete with estimates of cash flows, for investors’ consideration? 
YES NO 
vi) Are they able to simulate financial bids and come up with cash bid estimates that 
reasonably represent actual bids? 
YES NO 
vii) Does the staff have the capacity to process payments, analyze performance 
measures, and develop reports and trends? 
YES NO 
5. If any of the answers to Question 4 is NO, is there need to develop staff in ways that enhance their abilities? 
(Please provide a response to each question with a NO answer in 4.)  
6. What, in particular, do you think should be done to develop internal staff capabilities? (Please provide a 
response to each question with a NO answer in 4.) 
7. What specific steps have been taken to develop internal staff capabilities? (Please provide a response to 
each question with a NO answer in 4.) 
8. How do you monitor whether capacity issues already addressed (say, by training staff) are being reflected 
in staff performance?  
9. What remedies do you have in place to ensure that any variances (between expected performance after 
capacity enhancement and actual performance) are addressed? 
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Section V: Processes and information technology 
1. Is there need to implement new processes (information technology, procurement, etc.) to 
make it easy to work with prospective financiers?  
YES NO 
2. If the answer to Question 1 above is YES, which new processes need to be implemented? 
3. Do you need to use different systems or change structures or working relationships to work 
with the new processes?  
YES NO 
4. If your answer to Question 3 is YES, explain the nature of changes required. 
5. To what extent is the staff conversant with the workings of public–private partnership arrangements and 
project management? PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR RESPONSE. 
6. Do you need to develop new information technology systems or platforms to support the 
analysis and smooth running of infrastructure financing–related functions?  
YES NO 
7. If the answer to Question 6 is YES, what particular systems are being envisaged? In which specific ways are 
these systems going to support the infrastructure financing functions?  
8. In the absence of the systems and platforms alluded to in Question 6, how is the infrastructure financing 
function affected, if at all? 
9. Do you have adequate information technology personnel to develop the new systems 
and platforms alluded to in Question 6? 
YES NO 
10. If the answer to Question 9 is NO, in which specific way(s) is that shortage affecting the management of 
the infrastructure financing functions and related services?  
11. Do state departments dealing with infrastructure financing issues have adequate 
personnel who can use, troubleshoot, and update the new systems?  
YES NO 
Do state departments dealing with infrastructure financing issues have adequate 
personnel who can support (e.g., by way of training) new users of the new systems? 
YES NO 
12. Does the staff involved have adequate training in the use of software to manage/run 
the financing aspects of infrastructure development (e.g., software to aid in forecasting 
cash flows, computing IRRs)?  
YES NO 
13. Do all departments involved in infrastructure financing have in-house computer 
hardware and software experts to manage system crashes, troubleshooting, and other 
emergencies?  
YES NO 
14. If your answer to Question 13 is NO, how is the lack of expertise being addressed?  
15. Do departmental staff have the ability to run procurement and administrative processes 
effectively?  
YES NO 
16. If the answer to Question 15 is NO, what constraints do they face in those roles? Are those constraints being 
addressed? How? 
Section VI: General 
Please provide any additional information that you think might be useful to the government 
and/or the private sector in ensuring that public–private partnerships in infrastructure projects 
work well. 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
African Development Bank (AfDB). 2010. 6th Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) Annual 
Meeting: Agreement for Closer Collaboration on Regional Projects Among Stakeholders. Tunis: 
African Development Bank. 
__________. 2011a. Africa’s Infrastructure Outlook, 2040. Study on Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa (PIDA). Tunis: African Development Bank. 
__________. 2011b. Handbook of Infrastructure Statistics. Tunis: African Development Bank. 
__________. 2013a. The Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI). Tunis: African 
Development Bank.  
__________. 2013b. An Integrated Approach to Infrastructure Provision in Africa. Tunis: African 
Development Bank. 
African Development Bank (AfDB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Development Centre, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2013. 
Africa Competitiveness Report 2013. Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
__________. 2014. African Economic Outlook 2014: Global Value Chains and Africa’s 
Industrialization. Paris: OECD. 
African Union. 2014. Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA): Addressing the 
Infrastructure Gap in Africa, To Speed Up Regional Integration. Seventh Conference of African 
Ministers in Charge of Integration, 14–18 July, Swaziland. 
Ajakaiye, O. and Ncube, M. 2010. Infrastructure and Economic Development in Africa. Journal of 
African Economies 19 (AERC Supplement 1), i3–i12. 
Akinbobola, T.O. and Saibu, M.O.O. 2004. Income Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in 
Nigeria: A Vector Autoregressive Approach. Journal of Policy Reform 7, 175–83. 
Alexandersson, G. and Hultén, S. 2007. Prospects and Pitfalls of Public–Private Partnerships in the 
Transportation Sector—Theoretical Issues and Empirical Experience. Thredbo 10. International 
Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, Queensland, 
Australia. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277–97. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-
Component Models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29–51. 
Ayogu, M. 2007. Infrastructure and Economic Development in Africa: A Review. Journal of African 
Economies 16 (AERC Supplement 1), 75–126. 
Badawi, A. 2003. Private Capital Formation and Public Investment in Sudan: Testing the 
Substitutability and Complementarity Hypotheses in a Growth Framework. Journal of 
International Development 15, 783–99. 
Behar, A. and Manners, P. 2008. Logistics and Exports. CSAE Working Paper No. 2008–13, Oxford 
University. 
Bogetic, Z. and Fedderke, J.W. 2005. Infrastructure and Growth in South Africa: Benchmarking, 
Productivity and Investment Needs. Paper presented at Economic Society of South Africa 
(ESSA) Conference, 29–31 May, Durban, South Africa. 
Brautigam, D. 2010. The Dragon’s Gift: The True Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Briceño-Garmendia, C.M. and Shkaratan, M. 2010. Kenya’s Infrastructure: A Continental 
Perspective. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Briceño-Garmendia, C.M., Smits, K. and Foster, V. 2009. Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Patterns, Issues, and Options. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
54 
 
Brixiova, Z., Mutambatsere, E., Ambert, C. and Etienne, D. 2011. Closing Africa’s Infrastructure Gap: 
Innovative Financing and Risks. Tunis: African Development Bank. 
www.commonwealthministers.com/images/uploads/documents/Brixiova_ 9.pdf (accessed 
March 23, 2015). 
Bullock, R. 2009. Off Track: Sub-Saharan African Railways. Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic 
(AICD) Background Paper No. 17. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Cadot, O., Röller, L. H. and Stephan, A. 1999. A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure 
Allocation: An Empirical Assessment. The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) 
Discussion Paper No. 2336. Washington, DC: CEPR. 
Calderón, C. and Servén, L. 2004. The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and 
Income Distribution. Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS3400. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
__________, 2010. Infrastructure and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of 
African Economies 19, AERC Supplement 1, pp. i13–i87. 
Cassel, C., de Candia, G. and Liberatore, A. 2010. Building African Infrastructure with Chinese 
Money. http://www.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/pdf/ITFD10Africa.pdf (accessed March 18, 2015). 
Doh, J.P., Teegan, H. and Mudambi, R. 2004. Balancing Private and State Ownership in Emerging 
Markets’ Telecommunications Infrastructure: Country, Industry, and Firm Influences. Journal of 
International Business Studies 35, 233–50. 
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 1997. Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1203–50. 
Eberhard, A., Rosnes, O., Shkaratan, M. and Vennemo, H. 2011. Africa’s Power Infrastructure: 
Investment, Integration, Efficiency. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Egert, B., Kozluk, T. and Sutherland, D. 2009. Infrastructure and Growth: Empirical Evidence. 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 957, University of Michigan. 
Esfhani, H.S. and Ramirez, M.T. 2003. Institutions, Infrastructure and Economic Growth. Journal of 
Development Economics 70, 443–77. 
Estahe, A. and Vagliasindi, M. 2007. Infrastructure for Accelerated Growth in Ghana: Needs and 
Challenges. Unpublished manuscript. 
Fay, M. and Yepes, T. 2003. Investing in Infrastructure: What Is Needed from 2000 to 2010? Policy 
Research Working Paper No. WPS 3102. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Federke, J., Perkins, P. and Luiz J. 2005. Infrastructural Investment in Long-Run Economic Growth: 
South Africa, 1875–2001. World Development 34, 1037–59. 
Foster, V. 2008. Overhauling the Engine of Growth: Infrastructure in Africa. Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic (AICD) Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Foser, V. and Briceño-Garmendia, C. (eds.). 2010. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Gwilliam, K., Foster, V., Archondo-Callao, R., Briceño-Garmendia, C., Nogales, A. and Sethi, K. 2008. 
The Burden of Maintenance: Roads in Sub-Saharan Africa. Background Paper No. 14, Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Hagerman, E. 2012. Challenges to Regional Infrastructure Development. Pretoria: TIPS. 
http://www.tips.org.za/files/report_on_regional_infrastructure_development_in_africa_tips_-
_ellen_hagerman.pdf (accessed March 28, 2015). 
Halvorsen, R. 1995. Fiscal Incentives for Investment in Thailand. In A. Shah (ed.), Fiscal Incentives 
for Investment and Innovation (pp. 399–436). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Intenational Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2014. Measuring the Information Society Report: 
2014. Geneva, Switzerland: ITU.  
Irvig, J. and Manroth, A. 2009. Local Sources of Financing for Infrastructure in Africa: A Cross-
 Country Analysis. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Kaps, C. 2004. The Dynamic Effects of Public Capital: VAR Evidence for 22 OECD Countries. Kiel 
Institute for World Economics Working Paper No. 1224, Kiel, Germany. 
Kadiero, T. 2009. Infrastructure Investment in Africa. AfDB Development Research Brief No. 10. 
Tunis: African Development Bank. 
Kaffmann, C. 2008. Engaging the Private Sector in African Infrastructure. NEPAD-OECD Africa 
Investment Initiative. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Kemmerling, A. and Stephan, A. 2002. The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private 
Productivity and Its Political Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities. Public 
Choice 113, 403–22. 
KPMG. 2014. Sub-Saharan Africa Power Outlook 2014. KPMG Africa Infrastructure and Major 
Projects Group. http://www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/General-
Industries-Publications/Documents/2014%20Sub-Saharan%20Africa%20Power%20Outlook.pdf 
(accessed July 29, 2015). 
Loas, N. 2012. ABI: Africa’s Mobile Market to Pass 80% Subscriber Penetration in Q1 Next Year; 13.9% 
of Global Cellular Market by 2017. Tech Crunch, 28 November. 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/11/28/abi-africas-mobile-market-to-pass-80-subscriber-penetration-
in-q1-next-year-13-9-of-globalcellular-market-by-2017/ (accessed March 12, 2015). 
Maliane, C. 2014. The Theory of the Firm in the African Context. In C. Monga and J.Y. Lin (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Context and Concepts (forthcoming). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Mbku, J.M. 2013. Building Opportunities: Addressing Africa’s Lack of Infrastructure. Brookings 
Institute/Africa Growth Initiative. www.brookings.edu/foresightafrica (accessed May 7, 2015). 
Mittik, S. and Neumann, T. 2001. Dynamic Effects of Public Investment: Vector Autoregressive 
Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries. Empirical Economics 26, 429–46. 
Moreno, R., López-Bazo, E. and Artís M. 2003. On the Effectiveness of Private and Public Capital. 
Applied Economics 35, 727–40. 
Mundy, M. and Penfold, A. 2008. Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Sub-Saharan Africa. Background 
Paper No. 8, Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD). Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Munell, A.H. 1990. Why Has Productivity Growth Declined? Productivity and Public Investment. 
New England Economic Review (January/February), 2–22. 
Ncue, M. 2010. Financing and Managing Infrastructure in Africa. Journal of African Economies 19 
(AERC Supplement 1), i114–i164. 
Nduu, B.J. 2006. Infrastructure, Regional Integration and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dealing 
with the Disadvantages of Geography and Sovereign Fragmentation. Journal of African 
Economies 15 (AERC Supplement 2), 212–44. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2013. Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting, Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en 
(accessed July 15, 2015). 
Osoro, N.E. 1997. Government Spending, Taxes and Economic Growth: The Case of Africa. Paper 
presented at the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Workshop, 24–29 May, 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development and Task Group on World Summit on the 
Information Society (TG-WSIS), 2014. Final WSIS Targets Review: Achievements, Challenges 
and the Way Forward. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union. 
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). 2014. Addressing the Infrastructure 
Gap in Africa, To Speed up Regional Integration. Seventh Conference of African Ministers in 
Charge of Integration, 14–18 July 2014, Ezulwini, Swaziland. 
Reiikka, R. and Svensson, J. 1999. How Inadequate Provision of Public Infrastructure and Services 
56 
 
Affects Private Investment. Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 2262. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
Sacs, J., McArthur, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kruk. M., Bahadur, C., Faye, M. and McCord, G. 2004. 
Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No. 1, 117–240. 
Sanhez-Robles, B. 1998. Infrastructure Investment and Growth: Some Empirical Evidence. 
Contemporary Economic Policy 16, 98–108. 
Shepard, R., von Klaudy, S. and Kumar, K. 2006. Financing Infrastructure in Africa: How the Region 
Can Attract More Project Finance. Gridlines, No. 13. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Transnet. 2014. Africa Transport Infrastructure. 
http://www.transnet.net/BusinessWithUs/LTPF%202012/1.LTPF%202014_Chapter%2006__Africa_
Final%20Proof_Sept%202014.pdf (accessed May 8, 2015). 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 2005. Assessing Regional Integration in 
Africa. ECA Policy Research Paper. Addis Ababa: UNECA. 
_________ (UNECA). 2006. Water in Africa: Management Options to Enhance Survival and Growth. 
Addis Ababa: UNECA. 
UNECA and AUC. 2013. Report on Progress in Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in 
Africa, 2013. Meeting of the Committee of Experts of the Sixth Joint Annual Meetings of the 
UNECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and 
AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance. Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. 
Utz C. 2013. Improving the Outcomes of Public Private Partnerships. 
https://www.claytonutz.com/docs/improving_%20outcomes_ppp_2013.pdf (accessed July 18, 
2015) 
Väliä, T. 2005. How Expensive Are Cost Savings? On the Economics of Public-Private Partnerships. 
In Innovative Financing of Infrastructure—The Role of Public-Private Partnerships: 
Infrastructure, Economic Growth, and the Economics of PPPs. EIB Papers 10(1), 94–119. 
World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. 2014. Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 
2014 Update. Switzerland: WHO and UNICEF. 
Wold Bank. 2006. World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
Yeps, T., Pierce, J. and Foster, V. 2008. Making Sense of Africa’s Infrastructure Endowment: A 
Benchmarking Approach. Policy Research Working Paper 4912. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
Zee H.H., Stotsky, J.G. and Ley, E. 2002. Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy 
Makers in Developing Countries. World Development 30, 1497–1516. 
 PREVIOUS ISSUES OF ACBF OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 
 
Soumana Sako (2002), AFRICA: MAJOR DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES & THEIR CAPACITY BUILDING 
DIMENSIONS, OCCASIONAL PAPER 1 
 
Soumana Sako (2003), THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ECONOMIC & 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, OCCASIONAL PAPER 2 
 
Severine Rugumamu (2004), CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA: A SUMMARY 
OF LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM MOZAMBIQUE, RWANDA, SIERRA LEONE & UGANDA, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER 3 
 
Genevesi Ogiogio (2005), MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF INTERVENTIONS IN CAPACITY BUILDING: SOME 
FUNDAMENTALS, OCCASIONAL PAPER 4 
 
Soumana Sako (2006), CHALLENGES FACING AFRICA’S REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES IN CAPACITY 
BUILDING, OCCASIONAL PAPER 5 
 
Soumana Sako and George Kararach (2007), CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE PROMOTION OF TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT IN AFRICA - CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, OCCASIONAL PAPER 6 
 
Tadeous T. Chifamba (2007), MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: HOW SENSIBLY MUST AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES AND TRADE NEGOTIATORS STAND?, OCCASIONAL PAPER 7 
 
Andy Wynne (2008), PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LESSONS 
OF EXPERIENCE FROM GHANA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA. OCCASIONAL PAPER 8 
 
Mfandaedza Hove and Andy Wynne (2010), THE EXPERIENCE OF MTEF AND IFMIS REFORMS IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA – WHAT IS THE BALANCE SHEET?, OCCASIONAL PAPER 9 
 
George Kararach, Phineas Kadenge and Gibson Guvheya (2010), CURRENCY REFORMS IN ZIMBABWE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CURRENCY REGIMES, OCCASIONAL PAPER 10 
 
George Kararach (2010), HARD TIMES: THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND EMERGING CAPACITY 
CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA, OCCASIONAL PAPER 11 
 
Kobena T. Hanson and George Kararach (2011), THE CHALLENGES OF KNOWLEDGE HARVESTING AND THE 
PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MDGS IN AFRICA, 
OCCASIONAL PAPER 12 
 
Roger Tsafack Nanfosso (2011), L’ÉTAT DU RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS EN AFRIQUE, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER 13 
Kobena T. Hanson and Frannie A. Léautier (2011), DEVELOPMENT DRIVERS IN AFRICA: ROLE OF 
INNOVATION, OCCASIONAL PAPER 14 
 
Joseph R.A. Ayee (2011), SOCIAL INCLUSION AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN A FRAGILE AND POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA, OCCASIONAL PAPER 15 
 
Sams Dine SY (2011), FINANCEMENT DU DÉVELOPPEMENT RÉSILIENT AU CLIMAT EN AFRIQUE: 
ÉVALUATION PROSPECTIVE, CADRE STRATÉGIQUE ET PLAN D’ACTION, OCCASIONAL PAPER 16 
Peter K. Arthur (2012), FOOD SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN AFRICA: ISSUES, POLICY CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES, OCCASIONAL PAPER 17 
 
Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Timothy M. Shaw & Val Samonis (2012), IS BILATERAL AID RESPONDING TO 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA? OCCASIONAL PAPER 18 
  
Arku, G., Mkandawire, P., Aguda, N. and Kuuire, V. (2012), AFRICA’S QUEST FOR FOOD SECURITY: WHAT IS 
THE ROLE OF URBAN AGRICULTURE? OCCASIONAL PAPER 19 
 
André Corrêa d’Almeida (2013), THE RETENTION OF HIGHLY SKILLED RETURNEES IN MOZAMBIQUE: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH, OCCASIONAL PAPER 20 
 
Aminata Ndiaye et Paul Ndiaye (2013), CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE, DEGRADATION ENVIRONNEMENTALE 
ET QUETE D’UTILISATION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES : MIRACLE OU MIRAGE ? OCCASIONAL PAPER 21 
 
Daniel Sakyi and Eric Evans Osei Opuku (2014), REGIONALSIM AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A 
CONCEPTUAL AND TEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE, OCCASIONAL PAPER 22 
 
Paul Mkandawire, Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Frederick Armah and Godwin Arku (2014), REGIONALISM, 
FOOD SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, OCCASIONAL PAPER 23 
 
Hany Besada, Leah McMillan and Alireza Sanieipour (2014), REGIONALISM, TRADE AND THE GROWTH OF 
AFRICA’S ECONOMY, OCCASIONAL PAPER 24 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The African Capacity Building Foundation 
7th Floor, ZB Life Towers 
Cnr. Jason Moyo Avenue/Sam Nujoma Street 
P.O. Box 1562 
Harare, ZIMBABWE 
Tel: (+263 4) 702931/2, 790398/9, 700208, 700210/11 
Fax: (+263 4) 702915, 700215, 792894 
Email: root@acbf-pact.org 
Web site: www.acbf-pact.org 
 
 
ISBN:  978-1-77937-047-1 
